Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
Type of Medium
Language
Region
Years
Person/Organisation
Keywords
Access
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Princeton : Princeton University Press
    UID:
    gbv_723417083
    Format: Online-Ressource (263 p.)
    ISBN: 9780691002422
    Series Statement: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics v.22
    Content: Can foreign invaders successfully exploit industrial economies? Since control over economic resources is a key source of power, the answer affects the likelihood of aggression and how strenuously states should counter it. The resurgence of nationalism has led many policymakers and scholars to doubt that conquest still pays. But, until now, the "cumulativity" of industrial resources has never been subjected to systematic analysis. Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societ
    Note: Description based upon print version of record , Cover; DOES CONQUEST PAY?; Princeton Studies in International History and Politics; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Figures and Tables; Preface and Acknowledgments; Chapter 1. Does Conquest Pay?; Chapter 2. When Does Conquest Pay?; Chapter 3. Nazi-Occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944; Chapter 4. Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918; Chapter 5. The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924; Chapter 6. The Japanese Empire, 1910-1945; Chapter 7. The Soviet Empire, 1945-1989; Chapter 8. The Spoils of Conquest; Notes; Works Cited; Index;
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9781400821747
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780691029863
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Does Conquest Pay? : The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Princeton, N.J. :Princeton University Press,
    UID:
    edocfu_9958352637802883
    Format: 1 online resource (264 pages) : , illustrations.
    Edition: Course Book.
    Edition: Electronic reproduction. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1996. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
    Edition: System requirements: Web browser.
    Edition: Access may be restricted to users at subscribing institutions.
    ISBN: 9781400821747
    Series Statement: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics
    Content: Can foreign invaders successfully exploit industrial economies? Since control over economic resources is a key source of power, the answer affects the likelihood of aggression and how strenuously states should counter it. The resurgence of nationalism has led many policymakers and scholars to doubt that conquest still pays. But, until now, the "cumulativity" of industrial resources has never been subjected to systematic analysis. Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance. Liberman's argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany's capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France's seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89. Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international system is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman's findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action.
    Note: Frontmatter -- , Contents -- , Figures and Tables -- , Preface and Acknowledgments -- , Chapter 1. Does Conquest Pay? -- , Chapter 2. When Does Conquest Pay? -- , Chapter 3. Nazi-Occupied Western Europe, 1940–1944 -- , Chapter 4. Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914–1918 -- , Chapter 5. The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923–1924 -- , Chapter 6. The Japanese Empire, 1910–1945 -- , Chapter 7. The Soviet Empire, 1945–1989 -- , Chapter 8. The Spoils of Conquest -- , Notes -- , Works Cited -- , Index. , In English.
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Princeton, N.J. :Princeton University Press,
    UID:
    edocfu_9959233439902883
    Format: 1 online resource (264 pages) : , illustrations
    Edition: Course Book
    ISBN: 1-4008-0493-0 , 1-283-33970-6 , 9786613339706 , 1-4008-2174-6 , 1-4008-1254-2
    Series Statement: Princeton studies in international history and politics
    Content: Can foreign invaders successfully exploit industrial economies? Since control over economic resources is a key source of power, the answer affects the likelihood of aggression and how strenuously states should counter it. The resurgence of nationalism has led many policymakers and scholars to doubt that conquest still pays. But, until now, the "cumulativity" of industrial resources has never been subjected to systematic analysis. Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance. Liberman's argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany's capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France's seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89. Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international system is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman's findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Front matter -- , Contents -- , Figures and Tables -- , Preface and Acknowledgments -- , Chapter 1. Does Conquest Pay? -- , Chapter 2. When Does Conquest Pay? -- , Chapter 3. Nazi-Occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944 -- , Chapter 4. Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918 -- , Chapter 5. The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924 -- , Chapter 6. The Japanese Empire, 1910-1945 -- , Chapter 7. The Soviet Empire, 1945-1989 -- , Chapter 8. The Spoils of Conquest -- , Notes -- , Works Cited -- , Index , Issued also in print. , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0-691-00242-8
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0-691-02986-5
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Did you mean 9781400820740?
Did you mean 9781400821242?
Did you mean 9781400820757?
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. Further information can be found on the KOBV privacy pages