UID:
edocfu_9958352507102883
Format:
1 online resource (320 pages) :
,
illustrations.
Edition:
Course Book.
Edition:
Electronic reproduction. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2008. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Edition:
System requirements: Web browser.
Edition:
Access may be restricted to users at subscribing institutions.
ISBN:
9781400828319
Content:
Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world's leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?, he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.
Note:
Frontmatter --
,
Contents --
,
Preface and Acknowledgments --
,
General Introduction and Outline of the Book --
,
Chapter One. Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? /
,
Chapter Two. Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All? /
,
Chapter Three. The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First-Century Approach /
,
Chapter Four. Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Supervision /
,
Chapter Five. Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk /
,
Chapter Six Controlling Risk in Payment Systems /
,
Chapter Seven. Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and the Central Bank /
,
Chapter Eight. Capital Requirements and the Behavior of Commercial Banks /
,
Chapter Nine. Rebalancing the Three Pillars of Basel II /
,
Chapter Ten. The Three Pillars of Basel II: Optimizing the Mix /
,
In English.
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1515/9781400828319
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400828319
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