Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

UID:

Format: XI, 217 S. , Ill., graph. Darst. , 25 cm

ISBN: 0691151040 , 0691151059 , 9780691151045 , 9780691151052

Note: Formerly CIP Uk. - Includes bibliographical references (p. [185]-201) and index. - Introduction -- The measure of law : estimating preferences across institutions and time -- Disentangling law and policy preferences -- Law matters -- Causes and consequences of diverse legal values -- Separation of powers and the strategic constraint -- Signals from the executive -- Conclusion , Introduction -- The measure of law : estimating preferences across institutions and time -- Disentangling law and policy preferences -- Law matters -- Causes and consequences of diverse legal values -- Separation of powers and the strategic constraint -- Signals from the executive -- Conclusion.

Additional Edition: Online-Ausg. Bailey, Michael A. The Constrained Court Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2011 ISBN 9781400840267

Language: English

Subjects: Political Science

Keywords: USA Supreme Court ; Politik ; USA Supreme Court

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (216 p.) : , 28 halftones. 20 line illus. 12 tables.

Edition: Course Book

ISBN: 9781400840267

Content: How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? The Constrained Court combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman show how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, Bailey and Maltzman document that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The authors find considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, Bailey and Maltzman show that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. The Constrained Court shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs. By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.

Note: Frontmatter -- , Contents -- , Preface -- , 1. Introduction -- , 2. The Measure of Law: Estimating Preferences across Institutions and Time -- , Part I. Legal Value Constraints -- , 3. Disentangling Law and Policy Preferences -- , 4. Law Matters -- , 5. Causes and Consequences of Diverse Legal Values -- , Part II. Political Constraints -- , 6. Separation of Powers and the Strategic Constraint -- , 7. Signals from the Executive -- , 8. Conclusion -- , Appendix. Statistical Details -- , Notes -- , References -- , Index , In English.

Language: English

DOI: 10.1515/9781400840267

URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400840267

URL: https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400840267

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (216 p.)

Edition: Course Book

ISBN: 1-283-16903-7 , 9786613169037 , 1-4008-4026-0

Content: How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? The Constrained Court combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman show how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, Bailey and Maltzman document that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The authors find considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, Bailey and Maltzman show that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. The Constrained Court shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs. By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.

Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Frontmatter -- , Contents -- , Preface -- , 1. Introduction -- , 2. The Measure of Law: Estimating Preferences across Institutions and Time -- , Part I. Legal Value Constraints -- , 3. Disentangling Law and Policy Preferences -- , 4. Law Matters -- , 5. Causes and Consequences of Diverse Legal Values -- , Part II. Political Constraints -- , 6. Separation of Powers and the Strategic Constraint -- , 7. Signals from the Executive -- , 8. Conclusion -- , Appendix. Statistical Details -- , Notes -- , References -- , Index , Issued also in print. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-691-15104-0

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-691-15105-9

Language: English

DOI: 10.1515/9781400840267