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  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Bingley, U.K. :Emerald,
    UID:
    almafu_9961831720002883
    Umfang: 1 online resource (272 p.)
    ISBN: 9781783501212 (electronic bk.) :
    Serie: Advances in financial economics, v. 16
    Inhalt: This volume contains a set of empirical papers by a set of global scholars who examine corporate governance and market regulation from a variety of perspectives. Jiang, Kim and Zhang argue that in certain cases an ex post increase in CEO pay can prevent the ex ante problem of managerial underinvestment and thereby help to reduce the agency problems characteristic of modern firms. Akyol and Cohen focus on firms use of executive search firms versus allowing internal members to nominate new directors to serve on the board of directors. Choi, Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal examine 361 CEO terminations occurring among the Fortune Global 500 firms during the years 2000 to 2006. Cashman, Gillan and Whitby investigate the labor market for corporate directors to better understand which director attributes are relevant for board selection. Baulkaran, Amoako-Adu and Smith analyze the link between the valuation discount of dual class companies and the channels through which private benefits can be extracted. Aggarwal examines ETFs and notes that the additional risks, complexity, and reduced transparency of these funds have attracted heightened attention by regulators.
    Anmerkung: The increase in CEO pay after large investments : is it purely rent extraction? / Zhan Jiang, Kenneth A. Kim, Yilei Zhang -- Who chooses board members? / Ali C. Akyol, Lauren Cohen -- The growth of global ETFs and regulatory challenges / Reena Aggarwal, Laura Schofield -- Overconfidence, corporate governance, and global CEO turnover / Hyung-Suk Choi ... [et al.] -- Human and social capital in the labor market for directors / George D. Cashman, Stuart L. Gillan, Ryan J. Whitby -- Dual class discount, and the channels of extraction of private benefits / Ben Amoako-Adu, Vishaal Baulkaran, Brian F. Smith -- A crisis of investor confidence : corporate governance and the imbalance of power / Richard L. Wise.
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9781783501205
    Sprache: Englisch
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  • 2
    UID:
    gbv_1654993239
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 260 Seiten)
    Ausgabe: First edition
    ISBN: 9781783501205
    Serie: Advances in financial economics volume 16
    Inhalt: This volume contains a set of empirical papers by a set of global scholars who examine corporate governance and market regulation from a variety of perspectives. Jiang, Kim and Zhang argue that in certain cases an ex post increase in CEO pay can prevent the ex ante problem of managerial underinvestment and thereby help to reduce the agency problems characteristic of modern firms. Akyol and Cohen focus on firms use of executive search firms versus allowing internal members to nominate new directors to serve on the board of directors. Choi, Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal examine 361 CEO terminations occurring among the Fortune Global 500 firms during the years 2000 to 2006. Cashman, Gillan and Whitby investigate the labor market for corporate directors to better understand which director attributes are relevant for board selection. Baulkaran, Amoako-Adu and Smith analyze the link between the valuation discount of dual class companies and the channels through which private benefits can be extracted. Aggarwal examines ETFs and notes that the additional risks, complexity, and reduced transparency of these funds have attracted heightened attention by regulators.
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9781783501205
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Advances in financial economics Bingley [u.a.] : Emerald, 2013 ISBN 9781783501205
    Sprache: Englisch
    Schlagwort(e): Aufsatzsammlung
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Dazugehörige Titel
    UID:
    gbv_1922776068
    ISBN: 9781783501205
    In: Advances in financial economics, Bingley : Emerald, 2013, (2013), Seite iv, 9781783501205
    In: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    In: year:2013
    In: pages:iv
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Dazugehörige Titel
    UID:
    gbv_192277605X
    ISBN: 9781783501205
    In: Advances in financial economics, Bingley : Emerald, 2013, (2013), Seite vii-viii, 9781783501205
    In: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    In: year:2013
    In: pages:vii-viii
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Dazugehörige Titel
    UID:
    gbv_1922776092
    ISBN: 9781783501205
    In: Advances in financial economics, Bingley : Emerald, 2013, (2013), Seite i, 9781783501205
    In: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    In: year:2013
    In: pages:i
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
    UID:
    gbv_1922776106
    ISBN: 9781783501205
    Inhalt: Purpose This study examines the director labor market to better understand which director attributes are important for board service. Design/Methodology/Approach Director level data, which includes proxies for both human and social capital, is analyzed to determine which characteristics increase the likelihood of gaining additional board appointments. Findings We find that general skills and director connections are valued in the marketplace. Among specific director characteristics, financial expertise, holding an MBA degree, and S&P 500 experience are positively associated with gaining new board appointments. Moreover, regardless of the director’s level of expertise, highly connected individuals are more likely to obtain new appointments. Finally, from a range of characteristics, only director connections mitigate the negative consequences of serving on the boards of firms that restate their financials. Originality/Value While most research has analyzed the effectiveness of boards of directors as a whole, this study examines the value of individual director characteristics within the context of the labor market.
    In: Advances in financial economics, Bingley : Emerald, 2013, (2013), Seite 137-166, 9781783501205
    In: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    In: year:2013
    In: pages:137-166
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
    UID:
    gbv_1922760633
    ISBN: 9781783501205
    Inhalt: Purpose The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings. Design/methodology/approach With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings. Findings Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures. Originality/value The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.
    In: Advances in financial economics, Bingley : Emerald, 2013, (2014), Seite 165-218, 9781783501205
    In: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    In: year:2014
    In: pages:165-218
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Dazugehörige Titel
    UID:
    gbv_1922776041
    ISBN: 9781783501205
    In: Advances in financial economics, Bingley : Emerald, 2013, (2013), Seite 257-260, 9781783501205
    In: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    In: year:2013
    In: pages:257-260
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 9
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Dazugehörige Titel
    UID:
    gbv_1922776084
    ISBN: 9781783501205
    In: Advances in financial economics, Bingley : Emerald, 2013, (2013), Seite ii, 9781783501205
    In: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    In: year:2013
    In: pages:ii
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 10
    UID:
    gbv_1922776122
    ISBN: 9781783501205
    Inhalt: Purpose To explore the importance of the board of director nomination process (that is, who nominates a given director for a position on the firm’s board) for the voting outcomes, disciplining of management, and overall monitoring quality of the board of directors. Design/methodology/approach We exploit a recent regulation passed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requiring disclosure of the board nomination process. In particular, we focus on firms’ use of executive search firms versus allowing internal members (often simply the CEO) to nominate new directors to serve on the board of directors. Findings We show that companies that use search firms to find board members pay their CEOs significantly higher salaries and significantly higher total compensations. Further, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly less likely to fire their CEOs following negative performance. In addition, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and see abnormally low returns from this M&A activity. We instrument the endogenous choice of using an executive search through the varying geographic distance of companies to executive search firms. Using this instrumental variable framework, we show search firm-identified independent directors’ negative impact on firm performance, consistent with firm behavior and governance consequences we document. Originality/value Given the recent law passage, we are the first to directly analyze the nomination process, and show a surprisingly large predictive effect of seemingly arm’s-length nominations. This has clear implications for thinking carefully through how independence is defined in the director nomination process.
    In: Advances in financial economics, Bingley : Emerald, 2013, (2013), Seite 43-77, 9781783501205
    In: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    In: year:2013
    In: pages:43-77
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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