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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    No Prices No Games! : Four Economic Models. (2024)
    Cambridge, UK :Open Book Publishers,
    Details
    UID:
    edoccha_9961497065202883
    Format: 1 online resource (154 pages)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-80511-310-0
    Content: "While current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions:• A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will.• A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden.• A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices.• Systematic biases in agents' preferences. These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically - we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games" - publisher's website.
    Note: Intro -- Personal Note -- Notation and Terminology -- 0 Introduction -- 0.1 The Book -- 0.2 The Notion of an Economy -- 0.3 Examples of Economies -- 0.4 Equilibrium Concepts -- 1 Equilibrium in the Jungle -- 1.1 The Housing Jungle: Model and Equilibrium -- 1.2 The Jungle Equilibrium: Welfare -- 1.3 Comparison to the Competitive Equilibrium -- 1.4 Comments on the Jungle Equilibrium -- 1.5 The Division Jungle -- 1.6 The Division Jungle: Comments on Welfare -- 1.7 A Didactic Perspective -- 2 The Permissible and the Forbidden -- 2.1 The Y-Equilibrium Concept 2.2 Y-Equilibrium, Pareto Optimality, and Envy-Freeness -- 2.3 Euclidean Economies -- 2.4 The ``Kosher'' Economy -- 2.5 Convex Y-Equilibrium -- 2.6 Pareto Optimality and Existence of Convex Y-Equilibrium -- 2.7 A Structure Theorem for Convex Y-equilibrium -- 2.8 The Division Economy -- 2.9 The Give-and-Take Economy -- 2.10 The Stay Close Economy -- 3 Status and Indoctrination -- 3.1 Status Equilibrium -- 3.2 Status Equilibrium ... Examples -- 3.3 A Detour: Convex Preferences -- 3.4 Primitive Equilibrium -- 3.5 A First Welfare Theorem -- 3.6 A Second Welfare Theorem 3.7 Primitive Equilibrium ... Examples -- 3.8 Initial Status Equilibrium -- 4 Biased Preferences Equilibrium -- 4.1 The Economy and the Equilibrium Concept -- 4.2 The Give-and-Take Economy -- 4.3 The Fixed-Prices Exchange Economy -- 4.4 Housing-Type Economies -- 5 A Comparison to Game Theory -- 5.1 The Matching Economy -- 5.2 The Jungle Equilibrium -- 5.3 Restricting Partnerships: Pairwise Y-equilibrium -- 5.4 Prestige by Partner: Status Equilibrium -- 5.5 Prestige by Self: Initial Status Equilibrium -- 5.6 A Comparison of Approaches -- 5.7 The Majority Voting Economy -- 5.8 Convex Y-equilibrium 5.9 Biased Preferences Equilibrium -- 5.10 The Majority Voting Game and Nash Equilibrium -- 5.11 Comparing our Approaches with Nash Equilibrium -- References.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-80511-308-9
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    FU Berlin
    Charité
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    No prices no games! : four economic models (2024)
    Cambridge :Open Book Publishers,
    Details
    UID:
    almahu_9949792866202882
    Format: 1 online resource (xxi, 236 pages) : , 13 colour illustrations, 7 tables.
    ISBN: 9781805113102
    Content: "While current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions: A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will ; A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden ; A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices ; Systematic biases in agents' preferences. These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically - we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games."--Publisher's website.
    Note: Available through Open Book Publishers. , Introduction / Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein -- 1. Equilibrium in the Jungle / Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein -- 2. The Permissible and the Forbidden / Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein -- 3. Status and Indoctrination / Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein -- 4. Biased Preferences Equilibrium / Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein -- 5. A Comparison to Game Theory / Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein. , Mode of access: World Wide Web.
    Language: English
    URL: Connect to e-book
    URL: Connect to cover image
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: Cover
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Stabi Berlin
    HU Berlin
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    No prices no games! : four economic models (2024)
    [Cambridge, UK?] :Open Book Publishers,
    Details
    UID:
    kobvindex_HPB1431223605
    Format: 1 online resource (133 pages)
    ISBN: 9781805113102 , 1805113100
    Content: "While current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions:• A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will.• A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden.• A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices.• Systematic biases in agents' preferences. These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically - we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games" - publisher's website.
    Note: Intro -- Personal Note -- Notation and Terminology -- 0 Introduction -- 0.1 The Book -- 0.2 The Notion of an Economy -- 0.3 Examples of Economies -- 0.4 Equilibrium Concepts -- 1 Equilibrium in the Jungle -- 1.1 The Housing Jungle: Model and Equilibrium -- 1.2 The Jungle Equilibrium: Welfare -- 1.3 Comparison to the Competitive Equilibrium -- 1.4 Comments on the Jungle Equilibrium -- 1.5 The Division Jungle -- 1.6 The Division Jungle: Comments on Welfare -- 1.7 A Didactic Perspective -- 2 The Permissible and the Forbidden -- 2.1 The Y-Equilibrium Concept , 2.2 Y-Equilibrium, Pareto Optimality, and Envy-Freeness -- 2.3 Euclidean Economies -- 2.4 The ``Kosher'' Economy -- 2.5 Convex Y-Equilibrium -- 2.6 Pareto Optimality and Existence of Convex Y-Equilibrium -- 2.7 A Structure Theorem for Convex Y-equilibrium -- 2.8 The Division Economy -- 2.9 The Give-and-Take Economy -- 2.10 The Stay Close Economy -- 3 Status and Indoctrination -- 3.1 Status Equilibrium -- 3.2 Status Equilibrium ... Examples -- 3.3 A Detour: Convex Preferences -- 3.4 Primitive Equilibrium -- 3.5 A First Welfare Theorem -- 3.6 A Second Welfare Theorem , 3.7 Primitive Equilibrium ... Examples -- 3.8 Initial Status Equilibrium -- 4 Biased Preferences Equilibrium -- 4.1 The Economy and the Equilibrium Concept -- 4.2 The Give-and-Take Economy -- 4.3 The Fixed-Prices Exchange Economy -- 4.4 Housing-Type Economies -- 5 A Comparison to Game Theory -- 5.1 The Matching Economy -- 5.2 The Jungle Equilibrium -- 5.3 Restricting Partnerships: Pairwise Y-equilibrium -- 5.4 Prestige by Partner: Status Equilibrium -- 5.5 Prestige by Self: Initial Status Equilibrium -- 5.6 A Comparison of Approaches -- 5.7 The Majority Voting Economy -- 5.8 Convex Y-equilibrium , 5.9 Biased Preferences Equilibrium -- 5.10 The Majority Voting Game and Nash Equilibrium -- 5.11 Comparing our Approaches with Nash Equilibrium -- References
    Language: English
    URL: Open Book Publishers
    URL: Click here to view book
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    HPol Brandenburg
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