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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Berlin : De Gruyter
    UID:
    gbv_1656029022
    Format: Online-Ressource (512 S.)
    Edition: 2008
    ISBN: 9783110327076
    Series Statement: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis 22
    Content: This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9783110326680
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-3-11-032668-0
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Cover
    URL: Cover
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Frankfurt :Ontos Verlag,
    UID:
    edocfu_9959233099202883
    Format: 1 online resource (553 p.)
    ISBN: 3-11-032707-4
    Series Statement: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical analysis ; Bd. 22
    Content: This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Frontmatter -- , Acknowledgments -- , Note -- , Table of Contents -- , Introduction -- , Endnotes to Introduction -- , Chapter One: Self as Substance -- , Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- , Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- , Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- , Chapter Five: Hume's Positive Account of the Self -- , Bibliography -- , Index of Names -- , Backmatter , Issued also in print. , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 3-11-032668-X
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-299-72512-0
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Berlin/Boston :De Gruyter,
    UID:
    edocfu_9958354007202883
    Format: 1 online resource(512p.) : , illustrations.
    Edition: Electronic reproduction. Berlin/Boston : De Gruyter, 2008. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
    Edition: System requirements: Web browser.
    Edition: Access may be restricted to users at subscribing institutions.
    ISBN: 9783110327076
    Series Statement: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis; 22
    Content: This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
    Note: Frontmatter -- , Acknowledgments -- , Note -- , Table of Contents -- , Introduction -- , Endnotes to Introduction -- , Chapter One: Self as Substance -- , Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- , Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- , Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- , Chapter Five: Hume’s Positive Account of the Self -- , Bibliography -- , Index of Names -- , Backmatter. , Also available in print edition. , In English.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9783110326680
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9783110327083
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Berlin ; : De Gruyter,
    UID:
    almahu_9949473979302882
    Format: 1 online resource (512 p.)
    ISBN: 9783110327076 , 9783110238570
    Series Statement: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis , 22
    Content: This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
    Note: Frontmatter -- , Acknowledgments -- , Note -- , Table of Contents -- , Introduction -- , Endnotes to Introduction -- , Chapter One: Self as Substance -- , Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- , Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- , Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- , Chapter Five: Hume's Positive Account of the Self -- , Bibliography -- , Index of Names -- , Backmatter , Issued also in print. , Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. , In English.
    In: DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1, De Gruyter, 9783110238570
    In: DGBA Backlist Philosophy 2000-2014 (EN), De Gruyter, 9783110238488
    In: DGBA Philosophy 2000 - 2014, De Gruyter, 9783110636949
    In: eBook Package De Gruyter Ontos 2002-2012, De Gruyter, 9783110331226
    In: eBook Paket De Gruyter Ontos 2002-2012, De Gruyter, 9783110331219
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9783110326680
    Language: English
    URL: Cover
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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