Format:
1 Online-Ressource (XXII, 123 Seiten)
ISBN:
9783110494129
Series Statement:
Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte Band 191
Content:
Greenberg tackles one of Kant’s most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kant’s concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal.
Note:
Frontmatter -- -- Contents -- -- Acknowledgements -- -- Preface -- -- 1. Introduction -- -- 2. Causal Theories of Objects and Grice’s Causal Theory of Perception -- -- 3. Kant’s Theory of Practical Causality -- -- 4. Conscience: Remembering One’s Forbidden Actions -- -- 5. The New Problem of the Imputability of Actions -- -- 6. Maxims and Categorical Imperatives -- -- 7. Necessity and Practical A Priori Knowledge: Kant and Kripke -- -- 8. The Bounds of Freedom -- -- References -- -- Subject index
,
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
,
In English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783110494662
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Greenberg, Robert, 1934 - The bounds of freedom Berlin : De Gruyter, 2016 ISBN 9783110494662
Additional Edition:
ISBN 3110494663
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9783110494662
Language:
English
Subjects:
Philosophy
Keywords:
Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804
;
Handlung
;
Verursachung
;
Willensfreiheit
;
Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804
;
Kausalität
;
Erkenntnistheorie
;
Handlungstheorie
;
Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804
;
Kausalität
;
Erkenntnistheorie
;
Handlungstheorie
DOI:
10.1515/9783110494129
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
Author information:
Greenberg, Robert 1934-
Bookmarklink
