Format:
1 Online-Ressource (448 pages)
ISBN:
9783319232614
Series Statement:
Studies in choice and welfare
Content:
This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy. In this regard, the author eschews a strong methodological commitment or technical formalism; the approach is instead based on the presentation of political facts and illustrated via numerous real-life examples. This allows the reader to get acquainted with the philosophical and political dispute surrounding voting and collective decision-making and its links to social choice theory.
Note:
Preface; Contents; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1.1 On Interpretation; 1.2 A Philosopher Challenges a Mathematician: A Nineteenth-Century Dispute; 1.3 Democracy and Its Values; 1.4 The Contents of This Work; References; Chapter 2: Majority Decision; 2.1 A Short History of Social Choice Rules; 2.1.1 Decision-Making in the Church; 2.1.2 Majority Rule in Secular Decision-Making; 2.1.3 Political Theory and Majorities; 2.1.4 Majority Rule and the Rise of Modern Parliamentarism; 2.1.5 Conclusion: The Problem of Collective Reason; 2.2 Choices with Two Alternatives
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2.2.1 The Uniqueness of the Majority Principle: May´s Theorem2.2.2 May´s Theorem and Procedural Fairness; 2.2.3 Representation, Anonymity and Double-Counting: Mill´s Problem; 2.2.4 Conclusion; References; Chapter 3: On Voting; 3.1 A General Taxonomy of Democratic Social Choice Rules; 3.1.1 Aristotle´s Problem; 3.1.2 Parliamentary Voting Rules; 3.1.3 ``Plurality-Like´´ Election Rules; 3.1.4 Preference Rules; 3.1.5 How Rules Disagree; 3.1.6 The Power of Choosing a Voting Rule: Locke´s Problem; 3.1.7 Towards a Theory of Fair Voting Rules
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3.2 Criteria for Choice: Majority, Plurality, and Condorcet3.2.1 The Absolute Majority Criterion; 3.2.2 Condorcet, Plurality, and Borda; 3.2.3 Condorcet Against Plurality; 3.2.4 Applying the Social Choice Analysis: Plurality Rule and SV; 3.2.5 The Central Weakness: The Condorcet Paradox; 3.2.6 Condorcet Paradox and Parliamentary Rules; 3.3 Further Criteria for Choice: Borda and Beyond; 3.3.1 Beyond Ordinal Comparisons: Arguments for and Against; 3.3.2 The Borda Rule and the Structure of Preferences; 3.3.3 Saari´s Argument for Borda (and Against Condorcet); 3.3.4 Cardinal Voting-Rules
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3.3.5 For and by the People3.4 Applying Social Choice: Referendum-Rules; 3.4.1 Social Choice and Weber´s Problem; 3.4.2 The Problems of Plurality, Again; 3.4.3 The Swiss Practices; 3.4.4 California; 3.4.5 Maine and Washington; 3.4.6 An Example of a More Complex Agenda: New Zealand; 3.4.7 Agenda Power in Direct and Representative Democracies; 3.5 Another Perspective to Social Choices: Proportionality; 3.5.1 Proportional Representation Systems; 3.5.2 Additional Complexities; 3.5.3 Proportionality and the Theories of Representation; 3.5.4 Some Formal Properties of Proportional Rules
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3.5.5 A Note STV and Monotonicity3.5.6 Condorcet, Borda, and Proportionality; 3.5.7 Proportionality, Power and the Formal Coherence Thesis: Does PR Empower Minorities?; 3.5.8 The Majority Criterion and the Choice of Government; 3.5.9 The Cordorcet Criterion and the Choice of Government; 3.5.10 Conclusion: Trade-Offs and the Meta-paradox; References; Chapter 4: Arrow´s Theorem; 4.1 The Impossibility Theorems; 4.1.1 Arrow´s Theorem; 4.1.2 On Judgment Aggregation Paradoxes; 4.1.3 The Judgment Aggregation Impossibility Theorems; 4.1.4 On Interpretation
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4.2 The Conditions for Making Rational Collective Choices
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783319232607
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Social Choice and Democratic Values
Language:
English
Keywords:
Kollektiventscheidung
;
Demokratie
;
Politische Philosophie
;
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