Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
Type of Medium
Language
Region
Years
Person/Organisation
Subjects(RVK)
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bern : Peter Lang International Academic Publishing Group
    UID:
    gbv_1778733425
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (118 p.)
    ISBN: 9783653003086
    Series Statement: Finanzwissenschaftliche Schriften
    Content: The essays of the book are contributions to the game theoretic analysis of the State. Two of the essays develop further the analysis of political accountability. Political accountability is the study of how the behavior of politicians is shaped by the prospect of reelections. The essays in this book enrich this field by introducing aspects of coalition government and ideology. A third essay focuses on strategic behavior by states in repeated tax competition. The contribution of this essay is the reevaluation of a lower bound to admissible taxrates as a policy instrument to contain tax competition
    Note: English
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Frankfurt a.M. : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften
    UID:
    almahu_9948168557402882
    Format: 1 online resource
    Edition: 1st, New ed.
    ISBN: 9783653003086
    Series Statement: Finanzwissenschaftliche Schriften 119
    Content: The essays of the book are contributions to the game theoretic analysis of the State. Two of the essays develop further the analysis of political accountability. Political accountability is the study of how the behavior of politicians is shaped by the prospect of reelections. The essays in this book enrich this field by introducing aspects of coalition government and ideology. A third essay focuses on strategic behavior by states in repeated tax competition. The contribution of this essay is the reevaluation of a lower bound to admissible taxrates as a policy instrument to contain tax competition.
    Note: Doctoral Thesis , Contents: Coalitions and political accountability – Divisive politics and accountability – Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9783631596760
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Frankfurt am Main : Peter Lang, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften
    UID:
    gbv_1686953526
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 110 pages)
    ISBN: 1299432646 , 3653003083 , 3631596766 , 9781299432642 , 9783631596760 , 9783653003086
    Series Statement: Finanzwissenschaftliche Schriften Band 119
    Content: Coalitions and political accountability -- Divisive politics and accountability -- Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition -- Summary in German.
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , doctoral Freie Universität, Berlin 2009 , In English, with a summary in German
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9783631596760
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Kiss, Áron Essays in political economy and international public finance Frankfurt am Main : Peter Lang, 2009 ISBN 9783631596760
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Electronic books ; Hochschulschrift
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Frankfurt am Main ; : Peter Lang,
    UID:
    edoccha_9958982584602883
    Format: 1 online resource (126 p.)
    ISBN: 1-299-43264-6 , 3-653-00308-3
    Series Statement: FINANZWISSENSCHAFTLICHE SCHRIFTEN Essays in Political Economy and International Public Finance
    Content: The essays of the book are contributions to the game theoretic analysis of the State. Two of the essays develop further the analysis of political accountability. Political accountability is the study of how the behavior of politicians is shaped by the prospect of reelections. The essays in this book enrich this field by introducing aspects of coalition government and ideology. A third essay focuses on strategic behavior by states in repeated tax competition. The contribution of this essay is the reevaluation of a lower bound to admissible taxrates as a policy instrument to contain tax competition.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Ph. D. Freie Universität zu Berlin 2009 , Contents; 1 Introduction 5; 1.1 Game-theoretic analysis of the state 6; 1.2 The study of political accountability 8; 1.2.1 History and previous results 8; 1.2.2 Contribution of the thesis 17; 1.3 The study of fiscal competition 23; 1.3.1 History and previous results 24; 1.3.2 Contribution of the thesis 32; 2 Coalitions and political accountability 35; 2.1 Motivation 35; 2.2 Related literature 39; 2.3 Accountability of electoral blocs 42; 2.4 Accountability of the unity government 45; 2.5 Conclusion 55; 2.6 Appendix - Proof of Proposition 2 57; 3 Divisive politics and accountability 65 , 3.1 Motivation 653.2 Analysis 68; 3.2.1 The model 68; 3.2.2 Solving the accountability subgame 71; 3.2.3 Divisive politics in equilibrium 74; 3.2.4 Extension: Divisive politics by the opponent 75; 3.3 Conclusion 76; 4 Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition 79; 4.1 Motivation 79; 4.2 Related literature 81; 4.3 The Analysis 82; 4.4 Conclusion 88; Summary in German 89; Bibliography 97 , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 3-631-59676-6
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Frankfurt am Main ; : Peter Lang,
    UID:
    edocfu_9958982584602883
    Format: 1 online resource (126 p.)
    ISBN: 1-299-43264-6 , 3-653-00308-3
    Series Statement: FINANZWISSENSCHAFTLICHE SCHRIFTEN Essays in Political Economy and International Public Finance
    Content: The essays of the book are contributions to the game theoretic analysis of the State. Two of the essays develop further the analysis of political accountability. Political accountability is the study of how the behavior of politicians is shaped by the prospect of reelections. The essays in this book enrich this field by introducing aspects of coalition government and ideology. A third essay focuses on strategic behavior by states in repeated tax competition. The contribution of this essay is the reevaluation of a lower bound to admissible taxrates as a policy instrument to contain tax competition.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Ph. D. Freie Universität zu Berlin 2009 , Contents; 1 Introduction 5; 1.1 Game-theoretic analysis of the state 6; 1.2 The study of political accountability 8; 1.2.1 History and previous results 8; 1.2.2 Contribution of the thesis 17; 1.3 The study of fiscal competition 23; 1.3.1 History and previous results 24; 1.3.2 Contribution of the thesis 32; 2 Coalitions and political accountability 35; 2.1 Motivation 35; 2.2 Related literature 39; 2.3 Accountability of electoral blocs 42; 2.4 Accountability of the unity government 45; 2.5 Conclusion 55; 2.6 Appendix - Proof of Proposition 2 57; 3 Divisive politics and accountability 65 , 3.1 Motivation 653.2 Analysis 68; 3.2.1 The model 68; 3.2.2 Solving the accountability subgame 71; 3.2.3 Divisive politics in equilibrium 74; 3.2.4 Extension: Divisive politics by the opponent 75; 3.3 Conclusion 76; 4 Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition 79; 4.1 Motivation 79; 4.2 Related literature 81; 4.3 The Analysis 82; 4.4 Conclusion 88; Summary in German 89; Bibliography 97 , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 3-631-59676-6
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Frankfurt am Main ; : Peter Lang,
    UID:
    almahu_9949711201302882
    Format: 1 online resource (126 p.)
    ISBN: 1-299-43264-6 , 3-653-00308-3
    Series Statement: FINANZWISSENSCHAFTLICHE SCHRIFTEN Essays in Political Economy and International Public Finance
    Content: The essays of the book are contributions to the game theoretic analysis of the State. Two of the essays develop further the analysis of political accountability. Political accountability is the study of how the behavior of politicians is shaped by the prospect of reelections. The essays in this book enrich this field by introducing aspects of coalition government and ideology. A third essay focuses on strategic behavior by states in repeated tax competition. The contribution of this essay is the reevaluation of a lower bound to admissible taxrates as a policy instrument to contain tax competition.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Ph. D. Freie Universität zu Berlin 2009 , Contents; 1 Introduction 5; 1.1 Game-theoretic analysis of the state 6; 1.2 The study of political accountability 8; 1.2.1 History and previous results 8; 1.2.2 Contribution of the thesis 17; 1.3 The study of fiscal competition 23; 1.3.1 History and previous results 24; 1.3.2 Contribution of the thesis 32; 2 Coalitions and political accountability 35; 2.1 Motivation 35; 2.2 Related literature 39; 2.3 Accountability of electoral blocs 42; 2.4 Accountability of the unity government 45; 2.5 Conclusion 55; 2.6 Appendix - Proof of Proposition 2 57; 3 Divisive politics and accountability 65 , 3.1 Motivation 653.2 Analysis 68; 3.2.1 The model 68; 3.2.2 Solving the accountability subgame 71; 3.2.3 Divisive politics in equilibrium 74; 3.2.4 Extension: Divisive politics by the opponent 75; 3.3 Conclusion 76; 4 Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition 79; 4.1 Motivation 79; 4.2 Related literature 81; 4.3 The Analysis 82; 4.4 Conclusion 88; Summary in German 89; Bibliography 97 , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 3-631-59676-6
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Did you mean 9783653000016?
Did you mean 9783455003086?
Did you mean 9783653001006?
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. Further information can be found on the KOBV privacy pages