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Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (218 Seiten)

Ausgabe: 1st edition

ISBN: 9783748944942

Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-3-7560-1831-4

Sprache: Englisch

Fachgebiete: Rechtswissenschaft

DOI: 10.5771/9783748944942

URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)

URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)

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Umfang: 218 S. , online resource

Ausgabe: 1. Auflage 2024

ISBN: 9783756018314 , 9783748944942

Inhalt: Das Buch zielt darauf ab, ein grundlegendes Verständnis des Verbots der Selbstbegünstigung durch digitale Gatekeeper zu schaffen, wie es in Artikel 6 Absatz 5 des Gesetzes über digitale Märkte (DMA) festgelegt ist. Es erläutert die aktuellen Bedenken und bietet gleichzeitig Anleitungen für eine effektive Einhaltung. Bislang wurde den komplizierten Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Online-Suchmaschinen und anderen digitalen Diensten wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Dieses Buch versucht, diese Landschaft zu erhellen, indem es insbesondere die Grenzen zwischen Online-Suchmaschinen, Online-Vermittlungsdiensten und Online-Informationsdiensten aufzeigt, die von den designierten Gatekeepern bei der Gestaltung ihrer Systeme im Hinblick auf die Einhaltung des DMA berücksichtigt werden müssen. Artikel 6 Absatz 5 DMA zielt auf "Plattform-Umhüllungsstrategien" ab, die sich nachteilig auf Verbraucher und Unternehmen auswirken. Im Kern geht es dabei um die Präsentation oder das direkte Angebot (d. h. die Einbettung) von verschiedenen Diensten auf den Ergebnisseiten einer Online-Suchmaschine. Solche Praktiken sind nur dann zulässig, wenn Drittanbietern eines ähnlichen Dienstes die gleiche Gelegenheit zur Präsentation oder zum Angebot gegeben wird. Die Gleichwertigkeit setzt voraus, dass keine Ungleichgewichte bei den Rechten oder Pflichten bestehen und dem eingebetteten Erstanbieterdienst des Gatekeepers, seiner Online-Suchmaschine oder einem anderen zentralen Plattformdienst kein unverhältnismäßiger Vorteil eingeräumt wird. Das Buch entwirft genaue rechtliche Leitlinien für die Einhaltung dieser Verpflichtungen.

Anmerkung: A. Executive summary -- B. Legal, technical, and economic background -- C. Resulting principles for compliance with Article 6(5) DMA -- List of references -- Index

Weitere Ausg.: Printed edition: ISBN 9783756018314

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.5771/9783748944942

URL: https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748944942

UID:

Umfang: 1 online resource (217 pages)

Ausgabe: 1st ed.

ISBN: 3-7489-4494-2

Anmerkung: Cover -- A. Executive summary -- I. Principles for identifying a distinct First-Party Service that shall not be favoured -- II. Principles for identifying a Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged -- III. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service -- B. Legal, technical, and economic background -- I. Article 6(5) DMA in a nutshell -- 1. Equal treatment: The DMA's central obligation -- 2. Objectives: contestability and fairness -- a. Addressing gatekeeper's conflicts of interest -- b. Addressing platform envelopment strategies -- c. Covering any form of self-preferencing in online search -- 3. Gatekeeper's choice: (i) disintegrate own service, or (ii) integrate third parties equally without conferring an advantage upon the gatekeeper -- 4. The relevant criteria for compliance -- II. Identifying a distinct First-Party Service -- 1. Legal framework for the delineation of digital services -- a. Annex D(2): integrated services with different purposes or falling within different categories of CPS are always distinct -- b. Application to Article 6(5) DMA -- aa) Consequences for designated CPS -- bb) Application to other gatekeeper services -- 2. Definition of an OSE -- a. Irrelevance of the current design of search engines -- b. Definition in the DMA -- c. Qualification in the case law of the Court of Justice -- 3. Identifying a distinct service -- a. Objective: the DMA's aim to effectively curb platform envelopment strategies -- aa) The economic concept of platform envelopment -- bb) Platform envelopment pursuant to the DMA -- cc) Legal consequence: 'Distinct services' despite common components -- b. Services found to be distinct from an OSE -- 4. Delineation of OSEs from particular other services -- a. OSE vs non-search related services -- b. OSE vs search-related content. , c. OSE vs (generative AI) answering services -- d. OSE vs OISs -- aa) OSE and OIS cannot form a single service -- bb) Differences between an OSE and an OIS -- (1) Definition of an OIS -- (2) Navigating the web vs facilitating transactions -- i. End users' perspective -- ii. Business users' perspective -- iii. Relevant factors -- (3) Crawling of websites vs direct contracts with business users -- cc) The example of Alphabet: on Google's shift to integrating specialised search and intermediation services -- (1) Google Search became market leader by limiting itself to an OSE -- (2) Limits of Google's OSE in facilitating transactions -- (3) Google's specialised search technology to facilitate transactions -- dd) Google's OISs as distinct services - findings in Google Search (Shopping) -- e. OSE vs non-OIS specialised search services -- f. Borderline between OSE and OIS/verticals in case of overlapping elements -- 5. In particular: standalone, partly, and entirely embedded OIS/Vertical -- a. The concept of embedding as developed in Google Search (Shopping) -- b. Concept of embedding in Article 6(5) DMA -- c. Economic background: use of different access points for the same service -- aa) Relevance of access points to use a service -- bb) Different access points to use Google Search -- cc) Different access points to use Alphabet's OIS/Verticals -- dd) Conclusion: specialised results in OSE serve as access point to OIS/Vertical -- d. Clarification in the Commission's designation decision -- III. Identifying a similar Third-Party Service -- 1. Similar service -- 2. Service of a third party -- 3. Protection of each third party providing a similar service -- IV. Identifying a more favourable treatment -- 1. Background -- a. 15 years of Google Search (Shopping) proceeding clarified the abuse -- b. Competition law remedies failed. , c. Growing calls for structural remedies -- d. DMA's ban on self-preferencing as political compromise -- 2. Relevant treatment of services -- a. Differentiated treatment as relevant conduct -- b. Ranking -- aa) Definition: relative prominence -- bb) In 'search results' -- (1) Any information returned, including a service directly offered -- (2) In response to, and related to a search query -- (3) Including real-time interface adjustments -- cc) Results in any interface of any access point of the OSE -- c. Crawling and indexing -- d. Other treatments having an equivalent effect -- 3. More favourable treatment of First-Party Service -- a. Equal treatment vs no self-preferencing -- b. Conferral of advantage upon First-Party Service -- aa) Examples mentioned in recital (51) DMA -- (1) Better ranking of results leading to a service -- (2) Partial embedding of a service -- (3) Entire embedding of a service -- bb) Difference partial / entire embedding -- cc) Consequence: favouring does not require a service with a separate access point -- (1) Groups of results specialised in a certain topic -- (2) Considered or used by certain end users as a distinct service -- dd) Further examples of relevant advantages -- c. No equivalent for similar Third-Party Service -- aa) General framework -- bb) Equivalence of opportunity -- (1) Relevant opportunities relating to search prominence -- (2) Equivalence of prominence -- cc) No circumvention of ban on self-preferencing -- (1) Article 13(6) DMA -- (2) Dark patterns -- (3) Degradation of conditions or quality of the OSE -- dd) No remaining imbalance of rights and obligations -- (1) Article 6(5) sentence 2 DMA: "fairness" of "such ranking" -- (2) Inability to fully capture benefits of own innovation and efforts -- (3) Inability to compete for the full service -- (4) Inability of all similar third parties to compete. , (5) Improper conditions for third parties -- (6) Improper pricing -- ee) No conferral of a disproportionate advantage upon the gatekeeper -- (1) Conferral of advantage upon OSE or other CPS -- (2) Relevant advantages -- (3) Disproportionality of the advantage conferred -- d. No discrimination of dissimilar services with similar websites, including of direct suppliers -- aa) Ranking concerns of dissimilar third parties -- bb) Technical framework: OSE's function to rank diverse websites, not business models -- (1) OSEs' side-by-side display of complementary services -- (2) Neutrality as competitive factor for OSEs -- cc) Economic framework: advantages for direct suppliers of a ban on self-preferencing -- (1) Harms of self-preferencing for direct suppliers -- (2) (No) disadvantages for direct suppliers from competition amongst indirect suppliers -- (3) Gatekeeper's incentives to turn direct suppliers against rival indirect suppliers -- dd) Legal framework -- (1) Article 6(5) sentence 1 and sentence 2 DMA: relation for "non-discrimination" -- (2) Article 6(12) DMA and its relationship to Article 6(5) DMA -- (3) Subjective rights of dissimilar third parties -- ee) Consequences for compliance -- 4. Technical constraints, efficiency justifications and burden of compliance -- a. Framework: DMA compliance by design -- b. Gatekeeper needs to bear the costs of compliance with Article 6(5) DMA -- c. Constraints to achieve equal opportunities justify no self-preferencing -- d. Objective justification arguments raised in Google Search (Shopping) -- aa) Google's arguments regarding technical constraints -- bb) Rejection of objective justification by Commission and General Court -- d) No objective justification criterion in Article 6(5) DMA -- V. Consequences where no fair equivalent can be found -- C. Resulting principles for compliance with Article 6(5) DMA. , I. Safe harbour -- II. Individual assessment -- 1. Identifying a distinct service of a gatekeeper that shall not be favoured -- 2. Identifying a similar Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged -- 3. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service -- List of references -- Index.

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 3-7560-1831-8

Sprache: Englisch

UID:

Umfang: 1 online resource (217 pages)

Ausgabe: 1st ed.

ISBN: 3-7489-4494-2

Anmerkung: Cover -- A. Executive summary -- I. Principles for identifying a distinct First-Party Service that shall not be favoured -- II. Principles for identifying a Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged -- III. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service -- B. Legal, technical, and economic background -- I. Article 6(5) DMA in a nutshell -- 1. Equal treatment: The DMA's central obligation -- 2. Objectives: contestability and fairness -- a. Addressing gatekeeper's conflicts of interest -- b. Addressing platform envelopment strategies -- c. Covering any form of self-preferencing in online search -- 3. Gatekeeper's choice: (i) disintegrate own service, or (ii) integrate third parties equally without conferring an advantage upon the gatekeeper -- 4. The relevant criteria for compliance -- II. Identifying a distinct First-Party Service -- 1. Legal framework for the delineation of digital services -- a. Annex D(2): integrated services with different purposes or falling within different categories of CPS are always distinct -- b. Application to Article 6(5) DMA -- aa) Consequences for designated CPS -- bb) Application to other gatekeeper services -- 2. Definition of an OSE -- a. Irrelevance of the current design of search engines -- b. Definition in the DMA -- c. Qualification in the case law of the Court of Justice -- 3. Identifying a distinct service -- a. Objective: the DMA's aim to effectively curb platform envelopment strategies -- aa) The economic concept of platform envelopment -- bb) Platform envelopment pursuant to the DMA -- cc) Legal consequence: 'Distinct services' despite common components -- b. Services found to be distinct from an OSE -- 4. Delineation of OSEs from particular other services -- a. OSE vs non-search related services -- b. OSE vs search-related content. , c. OSE vs (generative AI) answering services -- d. OSE vs OISs -- aa) OSE and OIS cannot form a single service -- bb) Differences between an OSE and an OIS -- (1) Definition of an OIS -- (2) Navigating the web vs facilitating transactions -- i. End users' perspective -- ii. Business users' perspective -- iii. Relevant factors -- (3) Crawling of websites vs direct contracts with business users -- cc) The example of Alphabet: on Google's shift to integrating specialised search and intermediation services -- (1) Google Search became market leader by limiting itself to an OSE -- (2) Limits of Google's OSE in facilitating transactions -- (3) Google's specialised search technology to facilitate transactions -- dd) Google's OISs as distinct services - findings in Google Search (Shopping) -- e. OSE vs non-OIS specialised search services -- f. Borderline between OSE and OIS/verticals in case of overlapping elements -- 5. In particular: standalone, partly, and entirely embedded OIS/Vertical -- a. The concept of embedding as developed in Google Search (Shopping) -- b. Concept of embedding in Article 6(5) DMA -- c. Economic background: use of different access points for the same service -- aa) Relevance of access points to use a service -- bb) Different access points to use Google Search -- cc) Different access points to use Alphabet's OIS/Verticals -- dd) Conclusion: specialised results in OSE serve as access point to OIS/Vertical -- d. Clarification in the Commission's designation decision -- III. Identifying a similar Third-Party Service -- 1. Similar service -- 2. Service of a third party -- 3. Protection of each third party providing a similar service -- IV. Identifying a more favourable treatment -- 1. Background -- a. 15 years of Google Search (Shopping) proceeding clarified the abuse -- b. Competition law remedies failed. , c. Growing calls for structural remedies -- d. DMA's ban on self-preferencing as political compromise -- 2. Relevant treatment of services -- a. Differentiated treatment as relevant conduct -- b. Ranking -- aa) Definition: relative prominence -- bb) In 'search results' -- (1) Any information returned, including a service directly offered -- (2) In response to, and related to a search query -- (3) Including real-time interface adjustments -- cc) Results in any interface of any access point of the OSE -- c. Crawling and indexing -- d. Other treatments having an equivalent effect -- 3. More favourable treatment of First-Party Service -- a. Equal treatment vs no self-preferencing -- b. Conferral of advantage upon First-Party Service -- aa) Examples mentioned in recital (51) DMA -- (1) Better ranking of results leading to a service -- (2) Partial embedding of a service -- (3) Entire embedding of a service -- bb) Difference partial / entire embedding -- cc) Consequence: favouring does not require a service with a separate access point -- (1) Groups of results specialised in a certain topic -- (2) Considered or used by certain end users as a distinct service -- dd) Further examples of relevant advantages -- c. No equivalent for similar Third-Party Service -- aa) General framework -- bb) Equivalence of opportunity -- (1) Relevant opportunities relating to search prominence -- (2) Equivalence of prominence -- cc) No circumvention of ban on self-preferencing -- (1) Article 13(6) DMA -- (2) Dark patterns -- (3) Degradation of conditions or quality of the OSE -- dd) No remaining imbalance of rights and obligations -- (1) Article 6(5) sentence 2 DMA: "fairness" of "such ranking" -- (2) Inability to fully capture benefits of own innovation and efforts -- (3) Inability to compete for the full service -- (4) Inability of all similar third parties to compete. , (5) Improper conditions for third parties -- (6) Improper pricing -- ee) No conferral of a disproportionate advantage upon the gatekeeper -- (1) Conferral of advantage upon OSE or other CPS -- (2) Relevant advantages -- (3) Disproportionality of the advantage conferred -- d. No discrimination of dissimilar services with similar websites, including of direct suppliers -- aa) Ranking concerns of dissimilar third parties -- bb) Technical framework: OSE's function to rank diverse websites, not business models -- (1) OSEs' side-by-side display of complementary services -- (2) Neutrality as competitive factor for OSEs -- cc) Economic framework: advantages for direct suppliers of a ban on self-preferencing -- (1) Harms of self-preferencing for direct suppliers -- (2) (No) disadvantages for direct suppliers from competition amongst indirect suppliers -- (3) Gatekeeper's incentives to turn direct suppliers against rival indirect suppliers -- dd) Legal framework -- (1) Article 6(5) sentence 1 and sentence 2 DMA: relation for "non-discrimination" -- (2) Article 6(12) DMA and its relationship to Article 6(5) DMA -- (3) Subjective rights of dissimilar third parties -- ee) Consequences for compliance -- 4. Technical constraints, efficiency justifications and burden of compliance -- a. Framework: DMA compliance by design -- b. Gatekeeper needs to bear the costs of compliance with Article 6(5) DMA -- c. Constraints to achieve equal opportunities justify no self-preferencing -- d. Objective justification arguments raised in Google Search (Shopping) -- aa) Google's arguments regarding technical constraints -- bb) Rejection of objective justification by Commission and General Court -- d) No objective justification criterion in Article 6(5) DMA -- V. Consequences where no fair equivalent can be found -- C. Resulting principles for compliance with Article 6(5) DMA. , I. Safe harbour -- II. Individual assessment -- 1. Identifying a distinct service of a gatekeeper that shall not be favoured -- 2. Identifying a similar Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged -- 3. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service -- List of references -- Index.

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 3-7560-1831-8

Sprache: Englisch

UID:

Umfang: 1 online resource (217 pages)

Ausgabe: 1st ed.

ISBN: 3-7489-4494-2

Anmerkung: Cover -- A. Executive summary -- I. Principles for identifying a distinct First-Party Service that shall not be favoured -- II. Principles for identifying a Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged -- III. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service -- B. Legal, technical, and economic background -- I. Article 6(5) DMA in a nutshell -- 1. Equal treatment: The DMA's central obligation -- 2. Objectives: contestability and fairness -- a. Addressing gatekeeper's conflicts of interest -- b. Addressing platform envelopment strategies -- c. Covering any form of self-preferencing in online search -- 3. Gatekeeper's choice: (i) disintegrate own service, or (ii) integrate third parties equally without conferring an advantage upon the gatekeeper -- 4. The relevant criteria for compliance -- II. Identifying a distinct First-Party Service -- 1. Legal framework for the delineation of digital services -- a. Annex D(2): integrated services with different purposes or falling within different categories of CPS are always distinct -- b. Application to Article 6(5) DMA -- aa) Consequences for designated CPS -- bb) Application to other gatekeeper services -- 2. Definition of an OSE -- a. Irrelevance of the current design of search engines -- b. Definition in the DMA -- c. Qualification in the case law of the Court of Justice -- 3. Identifying a distinct service -- a. Objective: the DMA's aim to effectively curb platform envelopment strategies -- aa) The economic concept of platform envelopment -- bb) Platform envelopment pursuant to the DMA -- cc) Legal consequence: 'Distinct services' despite common components -- b. Services found to be distinct from an OSE -- 4. Delineation of OSEs from particular other services -- a. OSE vs non-search related services -- b. OSE vs search-related content. , c. OSE vs (generative AI) answering services -- d. OSE vs OISs -- aa) OSE and OIS cannot form a single service -- bb) Differences between an OSE and an OIS -- (1) Definition of an OIS -- (2) Navigating the web vs facilitating transactions -- i. End users' perspective -- ii. Business users' perspective -- iii. Relevant factors -- (3) Crawling of websites vs direct contracts with business users -- cc) The example of Alphabet: on Google's shift to integrating specialised search and intermediation services -- (1) Google Search became market leader by limiting itself to an OSE -- (2) Limits of Google's OSE in facilitating transactions -- (3) Google's specialised search technology to facilitate transactions -- dd) Google's OISs as distinct services - findings in Google Search (Shopping) -- e. OSE vs non-OIS specialised search services -- f. Borderline between OSE and OIS/verticals in case of overlapping elements -- 5. In particular: standalone, partly, and entirely embedded OIS/Vertical -- a. The concept of embedding as developed in Google Search (Shopping) -- b. Concept of embedding in Article 6(5) DMA -- c. Economic background: use of different access points for the same service -- aa) Relevance of access points to use a service -- bb) Different access points to use Google Search -- cc) Different access points to use Alphabet's OIS/Verticals -- dd) Conclusion: specialised results in OSE serve as access point to OIS/Vertical -- d. Clarification in the Commission's designation decision -- III. Identifying a similar Third-Party Service -- 1. Similar service -- 2. Service of a third party -- 3. Protection of each third party providing a similar service -- IV. Identifying a more favourable treatment -- 1. Background -- a. 15 years of Google Search (Shopping) proceeding clarified the abuse -- b. Competition law remedies failed. , c. Growing calls for structural remedies -- d. DMA's ban on self-preferencing as political compromise -- 2. Relevant treatment of services -- a. Differentiated treatment as relevant conduct -- b. Ranking -- aa) Definition: relative prominence -- bb) In 'search results' -- (1) Any information returned, including a service directly offered -- (2) In response to, and related to a search query -- (3) Including real-time interface adjustments -- cc) Results in any interface of any access point of the OSE -- c. Crawling and indexing -- d. Other treatments having an equivalent effect -- 3. More favourable treatment of First-Party Service -- a. Equal treatment vs no self-preferencing -- b. Conferral of advantage upon First-Party Service -- aa) Examples mentioned in recital (51) DMA -- (1) Better ranking of results leading to a service -- (2) Partial embedding of a service -- (3) Entire embedding of a service -- bb) Difference partial / entire embedding -- cc) Consequence: favouring does not require a service with a separate access point -- (1) Groups of results specialised in a certain topic -- (2) Considered or used by certain end users as a distinct service -- dd) Further examples of relevant advantages -- c. No equivalent for similar Third-Party Service -- aa) General framework -- bb) Equivalence of opportunity -- (1) Relevant opportunities relating to search prominence -- (2) Equivalence of prominence -- cc) No circumvention of ban on self-preferencing -- (1) Article 13(6) DMA -- (2) Dark patterns -- (3) Degradation of conditions or quality of the OSE -- dd) No remaining imbalance of rights and obligations -- (1) Article 6(5) sentence 2 DMA: "fairness" of "such ranking" -- (2) Inability to fully capture benefits of own innovation and efforts -- (3) Inability to compete for the full service -- (4) Inability of all similar third parties to compete. , (5) Improper conditions for third parties -- (6) Improper pricing -- ee) No conferral of a disproportionate advantage upon the gatekeeper -- (1) Conferral of advantage upon OSE or other CPS -- (2) Relevant advantages -- (3) Disproportionality of the advantage conferred -- d. No discrimination of dissimilar services with similar websites, including of direct suppliers -- aa) Ranking concerns of dissimilar third parties -- bb) Technical framework: OSE's function to rank diverse websites, not business models -- (1) OSEs' side-by-side display of complementary services -- (2) Neutrality as competitive factor for OSEs -- cc) Economic framework: advantages for direct suppliers of a ban on self-preferencing -- (1) Harms of self-preferencing for direct suppliers -- (2) (No) disadvantages for direct suppliers from competition amongst indirect suppliers -- (3) Gatekeeper's incentives to turn direct suppliers against rival indirect suppliers -- dd) Legal framework -- (1) Article 6(5) sentence 1 and sentence 2 DMA: relation for "non-discrimination" -- (2) Article 6(12) DMA and its relationship to Article 6(5) DMA -- (3) Subjective rights of dissimilar third parties -- ee) Consequences for compliance -- 4. Technical constraints, efficiency justifications and burden of compliance -- a. Framework: DMA compliance by design -- b. Gatekeeper needs to bear the costs of compliance with Article 6(5) DMA -- c. Constraints to achieve equal opportunities justify no self-preferencing -- d. Objective justification arguments raised in Google Search (Shopping) -- aa) Google's arguments regarding technical constraints -- bb) Rejection of objective justification by Commission and General Court -- d) No objective justification criterion in Article 6(5) DMA -- V. Consequences where no fair equivalent can be found -- C. Resulting principles for compliance with Article 6(5) DMA. , I. Safe harbour -- II. Individual assessment -- 1. Identifying a distinct service of a gatekeeper that shall not be favoured -- 2. Identifying a similar Third-Party Service that shall not be disadvantaged -- 3. Principles for excluding a more favourable treatment of the First-Party Service -- List of references -- Index.

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 3-7560-1831-8

Sprache: Englisch