UID:
edocfu_9959244873802883
Format:
1 online resource (358 p.)
ISBN:
83-7886-054-X
Content:
Game theory is a branch of mathematics that studies strategic interactions, i.e., interactions which involve more than one agent and in which each agent makes her/his decision while striving to predict the decisions of other agents. Game theory has been successfully applied in many areas of both the natural and social sciences, and it is the belief of this book's author that it can also be gainfully invoked in the area of legal philosophy. In this book, Wojciech Zaluski analyzes legal-philosophical concepts - such as legal interpretation, justice, legal rights, contract law, tort law, and prop
Note:
Description based upon print version of record.
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Cover; Title page; Table of contents; Acknowledgements; Preface; Part IIntroduction to game theory; Chapter 1. The basics of game theory; 1. Twelve questions about game theory; 2. What is game theory?; 3. What are the branches of game theory?; 4. What are the functions of game theory?; 5. What is a game?; 6. What assumptions does game theory make regarding players?; 6.1. Instrumental rationality; 6.2. Common knowledge of rationality; 7. What does game theory assume about players' knowledge?; 8. How can games be presented?; 9. What are the main types of games?
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10. What are the basic solution concepts of non-cooperativegame theory?10.1. Dominance; 10.2. Nash equilibrium; 10.3. Rollback equilibrium; 10.4. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium; 10.5. Sequential equilibrium; 10.6. Other refinements; 10.7. The Minimax Theorem; 11. What is cooperative game theory?; 11.1. The core; 11.2. The theory of stable sets - the NM-solution; 12. What is bargaining theory?; 12.1. The bargaining problem; 12.2. The Nash solution; 12.3. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; 13. What is evolutionary game theory?; Part II:Game theory and general issues in jurisprudence
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Chapter 2. The nature of law1. Law as a means for solving collective action problems; 2. A game-theoretic account of collective action problems; 2.1. Non-iterated games; 2.1.1. The first pure type of collective action problems:egoism as an obstacle for a collective action; 2.1.1.1. The Prisoner's Dilemma; 2.1.1.2. The Chicken; 2.1.2. The second pure type of collective action problems:coordination difficulties as the main obstacle forcollective action; 2.1.3. Mixed type of collective action problems; 2.2. Iterated games
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2.3. Contributions of evolutionary game theory to understanding collective action problems3. Three interpretations of the account of law as a means for solving collective action problems; 3.1. Three types of legal norms; 3.2. Three interpretations of the phrase 'Law is a meansfor solving collective action problems'; 4. The problem of legal normativity; 5. Concluding remarks; Chapter 3. Game theory and legal interpretation; 1. The notion of legal interpretation; 2. The semantic limits of legal interpretation; 3. The criteria for selecting a proper meaning; 3.1. Intentionalism
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3.2. Non-intentionalism4. The strategic reasons for failing to select a proper meaning; 5. Concluding remarks; Chapter 4. Legal rights; 1. Six questions about legal rights; 2. Two ways of justifying rights; 3. The nature of rights; 4. The function of rights; 5. The types of rights; 6. The justification of inalienable right; 7. The emergence of fundamental rights; 8. Concluding remarks; Chapter 5. Justice; 1. Game theory and the philosophical problems relatedto the concept of justice; 2. The circumstances of justice; 3. Justice as mutual advantage or justice as impartiality?
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3.1. Game theory as a tool for explicating the distributive ruleof justice as mutual advantage
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 83-7886-035-3
Language:
English
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