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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    College Station : Texas A&M University Press
    UID:
    gbv_1696203716
    Format: 1 online resource (272 pages)
    ISBN: 9781603445771
    Series Statement: Foreign Relations and the Presidency v.10
    Content: Even at the time it was announced near the end of the first term of the Reagan administration, such luminaries as William Safire mischaracterized the Weinberger Doctrine as a conservative retreat from the use of force in U.S. international relations. Since that time, scholars have largely agreed with Safire that the six points spelled out in the statement represented a reaction to the Vietnam War and were intended to limit U.S. military action to "only the fun wars" that could be relatively easily won or those in response to direct attack. In this work of extensive original scholarship, military historian Gail Yoshitani argues that the Weinberger Doctrine was intended to legitimize the use of military force as a tool of statecraft, rather than to reserve force for a last resort after other instruments of power have failed. This understanding sheds much clearer light on recent foreign policy decisions, as well as on the formulation and adoption of the original doctrine. With the permission of the family of former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Yoshitani gained access to Weinberger's papers at the Library of Congress. She is the first scholar granted access to General (ret.) John Vessey's archive at the Library, and her security clearance has made it possible for her to read and use a large number of materials still classified as secret or top secret. Yoshitani uses three case studies from the Reagan administration's first term in office-Central America and two deployments in Lebanon-to analyze how the administration grappled with using military force in pursuit of national interests. Ultimately, the administration codified the lessons it learned during its first term in the Weinberger Doctrine promulgated by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in a speech on November 28, 1984, two weeks after Reagan won reelection in a landslide. Yoshitani
    Content: Cover -- Contents -- Illustrations / ix -- Ronald Reagan delivers his fi rst inaugural speech / 2 -- The Reagans during the inaugural parade / 6 -- The Reagan Administration's fi rst National Security -- Reagan meets with Rep. Silvio O. Conte about El Salvador / 45 -- William Casey and Gen. David Jones / 57 -- Reagan meets with Sen. Charles Percy -- Reagan and key advisors discuss Lebanon / 87 -- Reagan and Pres. Amin Gemayel of Lebanon / 96 -- Reagan, George Shultz, and Robert McFarlane discuss Grenada / 115 -- Reagan, Shultz, and McFarlane discuss Grenada with -- Gen. John W. Vessey Jr. briefs congressional leaders -- Preface / xi -- Acknowledgments / xv -- 1. Defining and Challenging the Vietnam Syndrome / 1 -- 2. A Short Primer on Domestic Political Realities / 19 -- 3. The Casey Doctrine: Using Proxy Forces in -- 4. The Pentagon Doctrine: Using American Military Power -- 5. The Shultz Doctrine: Using American Military Power -- 6. The Weinberger Doctrine: A New Pattern for -- Notes / 143 -- Bibliography / 215 -- Index / 241 -- Back Cover.
    Note: Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9781603442596
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9781603442596
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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