In:
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 2, No. 1 ( 1972-09), p. 87-104
Abstract:
In 385B-C of the Cratylus, Plato appears to be formulating a version of the correspondence theory of truth, in such a way that it applies not only to discourse, but to individual names as well. However commentators who have remarked on this passage, either take exception to the reasoning, or find it necessary to interpret the conclusion with qualifications that Plato never could have intended. Richard Robinson, for example, on p.328 of “A Criticism of Plato’s Cratylus”, sums up the argument thus: . . . since statements have a truthvalue, their parts, including names, must have a truthvalue too. Therefore names are true or false. and criticises it for involving a fallacy of division. Lorenz and Mittelstrasse, by contrast, construe the argument as validly proceeding from the true-false distinction of sentences to a corresponding true-false distinction of their parts.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0045-5091
,
1911-0820
DOI:
10.1080/00455091.1972.10716866
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1972
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2067205-6
detail.hit.zdb_id:
280552-2
SSG:
5,1
