In:
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 74, No. 5 ( 2007-12), p. 749-760
Kurzfassung:
I examine recent arguments based on functionalism that claim to show that Bohm's theory fails to solve the measurement problem, or if it does so, it is only because it reduces to a form of the many-worlds theory. While these arguments reveal some interesting features of Bohm's theory, I contend that they do not undermine the distinctive Bohmian solution to the measurement problem.
Materialart:
Online-Ressource
ISSN:
0031-8248
,
1539-767X
Sprache:
Englisch
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publikationsdatum:
2007
ZDB Id:
2066891-0
SSG:
11
SSG:
19,2
SSG:
5,1