In:
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 4 ( 2015-10), p. 602-625
Kurzfassung:
Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this article is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centerpiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but that Linearity is not and, hence, that Chance Neutrality is not rationally required.
Materialart:
Online-Ressource
ISSN:
0031-8248
,
1539-767X
Sprache:
Englisch
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publikationsdatum:
2015
ZDB Id:
2066891-0
SSG:
11
SSG:
19,2
SSG:
5,1
