In:
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 879-891
Kurzfassung:
The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puzzling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, they constitute a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made in a Bayesian framework that represents credal states by single credence functions to avoid these conclusions, but none of them can do so for all versions of the Doomsday argument. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of ignorance and explains away these puzzles.
Materialart:
Online-Ressource
ISSN:
0031-8248
,
1539-767X
Sprache:
Englisch
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publikationsdatum:
2015
ZDB Id:
2066891-0
SSG:
11
SSG:
19,2
SSG:
5,1
