In:
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 1023-1034
Kurzfassung:
Current theories of addiction try to explain what addiction is, who experiences it, why it occurs, and how it develops and persists. In this article, I explain why none of these theories can be accepted as a comprehensive model. I argue that current models fail to account for differences in embodiment, interaction processes, and the experience of addiction. To redress these limiting factors, I design a proposal for an enactive account of addiction that follows the enactive model of autism proposed by Hanne De Jaegher.
Materialart:
Online-Ressource
ISSN:
0031-8248
,
1539-767X
Sprache:
Englisch
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publikationsdatum:
2015
ZDB Id:
2066891-0
SSG:
11
SSG:
19,2
SSG:
5,1