In:
International Transactions in Operational Research, Wiley, Vol. 29, No. 3 ( 2022-05), p. 1825-1841
Abstract:
In some security domains, the defender holds more private information than the attacker, such as the authenticity of resources. A mock camera can be adopted by the defender to deter potential attackers while the attacker may see it as a real one. This provides an opportunity for a defender with fake resources to bluff, as if all resources she owns are real. We model the bluffing behavior as a signaling game where the attacker is uncertain whether the defender is strong (all resources are real) or weak (fake resources disguised as real resources). We propose a mixed integer cubic programming formulation to solve for the solution concept based on perfect Bayesian equilibrium . We compare our bluffing security game model with a model without signaling. The experiments indicate that our model outperforms the no‐signaling model in terms of the defender's utility.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0969-6016
,
1475-3995
Language:
English
Publisher:
Wiley
Publication Date:
2022
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2019815-2
SSG:
3,2
