In:
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Wiley, Vol. 54, No. 1 ( 2007-02), p. 116-135
Abstract:
In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to European Union (EU) accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game‐theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes – allowing for regime shifts – depending on country characteristics and EU policies.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0036-9292
,
1467-9485
DOI:
10.1111/sjpe.2007.54.issue-1
DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00407.x
Language:
English
Publisher:
Wiley
Publication Date:
2007
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1473829-6
detail.hit.zdb_id:
219222-6
