In:
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley, Vol. 118, No. 3 ( 2016-07), p. 594-615
Abstract:
Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non‐contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0347-0520
,
1467-9442
DOI:
10.1111/sjoe.2016.118.issue-3
Language:
English
Publisher:
Wiley
Publication Date:
2016
detail.hit.zdb_id:
8170-X
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1473804-1
