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    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ; 2015
    In:  ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review Vol. 43, No. 1 ( 2015-06-24), p. 43-56
    In: ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), Vol. 43, No. 1 ( 2015-06-24), p. 43-56
    Abstract: Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental questions regarding their properties and efficiency remain unanswered. We consider such a service exchange model and analyze the users' interactions under three different approaches. First, we study a centrally designed service allocation policy that yields the fair total service each user should receive based on the service it offers to the others. Accordingly, we consider a competitive market where each user determines selfishly its allocation policy so as to maximize the service it receives in return, and a coalitional game model where users are allowed to coordinate their policies. We prove that there is a unique equilibrium exchange allocation for both game theoretic formulations, which also coincides with the central fair service allocation. Furthermore, we characterize its properties in terms of the coalitions that emerge and the equilibrium allocations, and analyze its dependency on the underlying network graph. That servicing policy is the natural reference point to the various mechanisms that are currently proposed to incentivize user participation and improve the efficiency of such networked service (or, resource) exchange markets.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0163-5999
    Language: English
    Publisher: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
    Publication Date: 2015
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 199353-7
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2089001-1
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