In:
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, SAGE Publications, Vol. 35, No. 4 ( 2005-12), p. 447-479
Abstract:
John Searle has recently developed a theory of reasons for acting that intends to rescue the freedom of the will, endangered by causal determinism, whether physical or psychological. To achieve this purpose, Searle postulates a series of “gaps” that are supposed toendowthe self with free will. Reviewing key steps in Searle's argument, this article shows that such an undertaking cannot be successfully completed because of its solipsist premises. The author argues that reasons for acting do not have a subjective, I-ontology but a first-person plural, Weontology that better accounts for agency and responsibility.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0048-3931
,
1552-7441
DOI:
10.1177/0048393105282918
Language:
English
Publisher:
SAGE Publications
Publication Date:
2005
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1494070-X
SSG:
5,1
SSG:
3,4
