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    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    SAGE Publications ; 2015
    In:  Party Politics Vol. 21, No. 2 ( 2015-03), p. 284-294
    In: Party Politics, SAGE Publications, Vol. 21, No. 2 ( 2015-03), p. 284-294
    Abstract: Why do members of parliament (MPs) vote against the party line? Recent explanations of party unity focus on MPs cross-pressured between the demands of competing principals such as their party and local constituencies. This article tests key claims of the Competing Principals Theory on the level of individual deputies. It relies on public statements in which MPs explain their voting behaviour. This new data source allows more direct insights into MPs’ decision-making calculus than roll-call data. The article develops a theoretical model for the usage of such statements and the position MPs take vis-à-vis the party line. Empirically, it studies Explanations of Votes on all roll-call votes in the 16th German Bundestag (2005–2009) statistically controlling for sample selection. The analyses show among others things that district MPs take more critical stances, party leaders dissent less and government MPs are more likely to voice reservations without defecting in voting.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1354-0688 , 1460-3683
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: SAGE Publications
    Publication Date: 2015
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1492251-4
    SSG: 3,6
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