In:
Management Science, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), Vol. 59, No. 1 ( 2013-01), p. 54-68
Abstract:
A real-effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors are not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they have to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity is significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 6% to 12%. However, the productivity effects are less clear cut when participants have prior experience with the baseline condition. Moreover, a forced distribution becomes detrimental when workers have access to a simple option to sabotage each other. This paper was accepted by Peter Wakker, decision analysis.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0025-1909
,
1526-5501
DOI:
10.1287/mnsc.1120.1624
Language:
English
Publisher:
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Publication Date:
2013
detail.hit.zdb_id:
206345-1
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2023019-9
SSG:
3,2
