In:
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Vol. 102, No. 1 ( 2020-03-01), p. 131-149
Abstract:
Recent publications (Henrich, Seeberg) claim that Kant has been profoundly influenced by contemporary publications on juridical deductions. I try to show, that this cannot be right. The introductory note of the “Transcendental Deduction” ( Critique of Pure Reason A 84) poses two questions: “quid facti?” and “quid juris?”. The first is answered by the demonstration of the possibility of relations between pure concepts and pure intuition und sensations, the second by the implicit refutation of David Hume. Kant and his interpreters sustain the possibility of using juridical concepts, that are neither related to real juridical facts nor are only metaphers, but have a special philosophical signification. But what should that be?
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1613-0650
,
0003-9101
DOI:
10.1515/agph-2020-1005
Language:
English
Publisher:
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Publication Date:
2020
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2045579-3
detail.hit.zdb_id:
455-8
SSG:
5,1
