In:
Kant-Studien, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Vol. 111, No. 4 ( 2020-11-25), p. 531-559
Abstract:
According to a familiar reading of Kant, he denies the possibility alleged by the rationalists of our having non-sensible or intellectual intuition. I argue in this article that he simply holds the possibility to be groundless . To put the contrast in terms of a distinction Kant makes in the A-Paralogisms, he raises a “dogmatic” objection to the rationalists in the former case, and a “critical” one in the latter. By analyzing the two-step argument in the B-Deduction, I defend the “critical” reading, which may, I hope, shed light on how Kant can justify his claim – which may be regarded as a second-order, methodological one pivotal to his Critical project – that possible experience serves as the only guideline for proving that we can cognize objects a priori .
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1613-1134
,
0022-8877
DOI:
10.1515/kant-2020-0051
Language:
English
Publisher:
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Publication Date:
2020
detail.hit.zdb_id:
3211-6
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2049354-X
SSG:
5,1
