In:
Corporate Ownership and Control, Virtus Interpress, Vol. 4, No. 4 ( 2007), p. 9-17
Abstract:
Using data on all family owned firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange for the entire period between 2001 and 2005, it is shown that agency theory prescriptions and monitoring activities differentially impact the market value and profitability of family owned firms. Specifically, nonfounder family firms benefit from a low level of board and insider stock ownership and a high level of stockholder and foreign investor ownership, because these firms necessarily face high agency costs. Conversely, founder family firms benefit from a high level of board and insider ownership, and a low level of stockholder and foreign investor ownership, owing to their lower agency costs
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1810-3057
,
1727-9232
DOI:
10.22495/cocv4i4c4p1
Language:
English
Publisher:
Virtus Interpress
Publication Date:
2007
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2155954-5
SSG:
3,2