In:
World Politics, Project MUSE, Vol. 16, No. 2 ( 1964-01), p. 287-301
Kurzfassung:
Chinese Communist military policy significantly affects our preparations for war and hopes for peace. However, we have few public studies of Chinese military policy and the reasoning on which it rests. 1 This article tries to set forth the calculus or rationale which Peking employs to select military strategy and tactics. In other words, it makes no attempt to attack or defend Chinese military policy or to appraise that policy's specific strengths and weaknesses. It does try to locate the important factors that operate in the minds of Chinese decision-makers and Peking's perception of the consequences of different tactical choices. When we say that the Chinese have a calculus for military policy, we do not mean to imply that it works well or badly. We do imply that the Chinese have a military calculus which imposes a predictable pattern on their military policy. Obviously, an identical military calculus does not operate in the minds of all Chinese leaders. Accordingly, “Peking thinks” is shorthand for the “averaged” views that can be induced from the public record of Chinese words and acts.
Materialart:
Online-Ressource
ISSN:
0043-8871
,
1086-3338
Sprache:
Englisch
Verlag:
Project MUSE
Publikationsdatum:
1964
ZDB Id:
200491-4
ZDB Id:
1497472-1
SSG:
3,6
