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Serie:
Rotman School of Management working paper no. 3095970
Inhalt:
I study voluntary disclosure of oligopoly firms when they learn information from asset prices. By disclosing information, a firm incurs a cost of losing competitive advantage to its rivals but benefits from learning from a more informative asset market. Adding a financial market helps the product market to escape from a bad nondisclosure equilibrium. Firms' disclosure decisions can exhibit strategic complementarity, leading to multiple equilibria. Due to the endogenous disclosure behavior of firms, more fierce competition in the product market can reduce consumer surplus and total surplus, and more noise trading in the financial market can increase price informativeness
Sprache:
Englisch
Schlagwort(e):
Graue Literatur
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3095970
URL:
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