Online-Ressource
Mannheim, Germany : ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten)
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Serie:
Discussion paper / ZEW no. 19, 062 (12/2019)
Inhalt:
We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a counteroffer. There is no commitment on the auctioneer's side to accept an offer as is or even to choose the lowest bidder. We compare this setting to a standard first-price auction both theoretically and experimentally. While theory suggests that the offers and the auctioneer's revenue should be higher in a standard first-price auction compared to the first-price auction with renegotiation, we cannot confirm these hypotheses in the experiment.
Sprache:
Englisch
Schlagwort(e):
Graue Literatur
URN:
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-545011
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