Ihre E-Mail wurde erfolgreich gesendet. Bitte prüfen Sie Ihren Maileingang.

Leider ist ein Fehler beim E-Mail-Versand aufgetreten. Bitte versuchen Sie es erneut.

Vorgang fortführen?

Exportieren
  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Munich, Germany : CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute
    UID:
    (DE-627)1751719731
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Serie: CESifo working paper no. 8942 (2021)
    Inhalt: Our results from a laboratory experiment offer new evidence for the detrimental effects that cheating behaviour in the workplace may have on the degree of reciprocity between firms and workers. First, we replicate existing findings showing that in the absence of monitoring (cheating is possible) workers cheat on their actual performance in a real-effort task. The extent of cheating influences how firms (managers) decide to set their wages in a subsequent gift-exchange game. Specifically, firms offer higher wages to workers who cheat and interestingly, workers expect such behaviour by firms. These higher wages are not matched by workers’ performance in the gift-exchange game, where cheating is not possible, resulting in a flat wage-effort relationship. In contrast, in the presence of monitoring (cheating is not possible), we find a positive relationship between wages offered and effort provided by the workers. Our findings have implications for adopting measures at the workplace that eliminate workers’ opportunities to cheat on their performance.
    Sprache: Englisch
    Schlagwort(e): Graue Literatur
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
Schließen ⊗
Diese Webseite nutzt Cookies und das Analyse-Tool Matomo. Weitere Informationen finden Sie auf den KOBV Seiten zum Datenschutz