Format:
1 Online-Ressource (57 p)
Content:
The revelation that scores of firms engaged in the illegal manipulation of stock options' grant dates (i.e. quot;backdatingquot;) captured much public attention. The evidence indicates that the consequences stemming from management misconduct and misrepresentation are of first-order importance in this context as shareholders of firms accused of backdating experience large negative, statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, shareholders' losses are directly related to firms' likely culpability and the magnitude of the resulting restatements, despite the limited cash flow implications. And, tellingly, the losses are attenuated when tainted management of less successful firms is more likely to be replaced, whereas relatively many firms become takeover targets. We believe this evidence is relevant to the ongoing debate about the economic relevance of seemingly inconsequential corporate misdeeds, in general, and option grants manipulation, in particular
Note:
In: Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009
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Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 1, 2008 erstellt
Language:
Undetermined
