Format:
1 Online-Ressource
Content:
Within the nexus of contracts that makes up the firm, relatively little is known about the relationship between firms and their directors. Using a unique dataset comprising director compensation and activity, I find that firms use meeting fees and equity-based compensation as substitutes. In addition, paying directors for attending board/committee meetings is associated with more active boards and more active monitoring and advising committees. In contrast, a higher proportion of equity-based compensation is positively associated with monitoring activity but negatively associated with advising activity. Furthermore, more active boards and committees are paid more. Finally, I find that the variation in director compensation and activity generally reflects trade-offs between the costs and benefits of director effort, consistent with prior work
Note:
In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 29, Pages 1–19, December 2014
,
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 11, 2014 erstellt
,
Volltext nicht verfügbar
Language:
English
