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Corruption under moral hazard / (1999)

Eskeland, Gunnar S. ; Thiele, Henrik. ; World Bank. Development Research Group. ; [et al.]

Washington, DC :World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics,

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UID:

almafu_9958094644702883

Format: 39 pages : , illustrations ; , 28 cm.

Series Statement: Policy research working paper ; 2204

Content: Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits.

Note: "October 1999"--Cover. , Also available in printing.

Language: English

URL: Volltext (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)