UID:
almafu_9958354146302883
Format:
1 online resource(191p.) :
,
illustrations.
Edition:
Electronic reproduction. Berlin/Boston : De Gruyter, 2011. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Edition:
System requirements: Web browser.
Edition:
Access may be restricted to users at subscribing institutions.
ISBN:
9783110325744
Series Statement:
Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis; 41
Content:
In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account.
Note:
Frontmatter --
,
TABLE OF CONTENTS --
,
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION --
,
CHAPTER II: AGAINST INTERNALISM --
,
CHAPTER III: AGAINST EXTERNALISM --
,
CHAPTER IV: THE VIEW OF PLATO --
,
CHAPTER V: AGAINST HYBRID VIEWS --
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CHAPTER VI: PROPERTY POSSESSION AS IDENTITY --
,
CHAPTER VII: OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES --
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BIBLIOGRAPHY --
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Backmatter.
,
Also available in print edition.
,
In English.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783110325089
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9783110325751
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1515/9783110325744
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110325744
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110325744
URL:
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9783110325744
