UID:
almafu_9960117121902883
Umfang:
1 online resource (xxix, 333 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-316-44391-4
,
1-316-44692-1
,
1-107-56525-1
Inhalt:
Is capitalism inherently predatory? Must there be winners and losers? Is public interest outdated and free-riding rational? Is consumer choice the same as self-determination? Must bargainers abandon the no-harm principle? Prisoners of Reason recalls that classical liberal capitalism exalted the no-harm principle. Although imperfect and exclusionary, modern liberalism recognized individual human dignity alongside individuals' responsibility to respect others. Neoliberalism, by contrast, views life as ceaseless struggle. Agents vie for scarce resources in antagonistic competition in which every individual seeks dominance. This political theory is codified in non-cooperative game theory; the neoliberal citizen and consumer is the strategic rational actor. Rational choice justifies ends irrespective of means. Money becomes the medium of all value. Solidarity and good will are invalidated. Relationships are conducted on a quid pro quo basis. However, agents can freely opt out of this cynical race to the bottom by embracing a more expansive range of coherent action.
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 01 Jan 2016).
,
Cover -- Half-title page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Dedication -- A Hippocratic Oath for Humankind -- Contents -- Tables -- Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Prologue -- Preliminaries -- 1 Neoliberalism -- Defining Neoliberalism -- Recalling Classical Liberalism -- Neoliberalism and Nuclearized Sovereignty -- 2 Prisoner's Dilemma -- The Standard Narrative -- A More Formal Presentation -- Prisoner's Dilemma pedagogy and neoliberal subjectivity -- Noncooperative Game Theory and the Shift to Coercive Bargaining -- Conclusion -- Part I War -- Introduction -- 3 Assurance -- Brief History of Game Theory -- Rational deterrence and game theory's ascendance -- Kahn's Defense of Nuclear Use Theory (NUTS) -- Schelling's Defense of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) -- Early US Responses to Strategic Nuclear Parity -- Conclusion -- 4 Deterrence -- NUTS and the Triumph of Prisoner's Dilemma Logic -- Carter's Conversion from Mad to Nuts -- Carter's Nuclear Security Dilemma -- The Inescapable Irrationality of MAD -- The Tacit Alliance between Offensive Realism and Game Theory -- The Road Not Taken -- Conclusion -- Part II Government -- Introduction -- 5 Hobbesian Anarchy -- Hobbes's Leviathan and the Prisoner's Dilemma -- Traditional Hobbes -- Hobbes's Foole and the rational actor -- Conclusion -- 6 Social Contract -- Buchanan's Social Contract and the Prisoner's Dilemma -- Buchanan's neoliberalism vs. Rawls's classical liberalism -- Coercion vs. inclusion -- Conclusion -- 7 Unanimity -- Unanimity vs. Unanimous Agreement to Terms -- Unanimity Scrutinized -- Coercive Bargaining and Unanimity -- Conclusion -- 8 Consent -- Consent in Posner's system of Justice as Wealth Maximization -- Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency: No Need to Compensate Losers -- Neoliberalism's equation of Ex Ante and Ex Post Consent -- Conclusion -- 9 Collective Action.
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A Planetary Prisoner's Dilemma: Game Theory Meets Global Warming -- The Strategically Rational Failures of Collective Action -- The Imperceptibility of Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action -- The malevolent Backhand of Neoliberal Governance40 -- Conclusion -- Part III Evolution -- Introduction -- 10 Selfish Gene -- Dawkins's Selfish Gene Theory -- Selfish Gene Theory and Game Theory -- Social Implications of Selfish Gene Theory -- Conclusion -- 11 Tit for Tat -- Almost Unlocking the Repeating Prisoner's Dilemma -- Tit for Tat and Rule Following -- Conclusion -- Conclusion -- 12 Pax Americana -- Neoliberal Political Philosophy -- Retrospective and Prospective -- Resisting Neoliberal Subjectivity -- Bibliography -- Index.
,
English
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-107-67119-1
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-107-06403-1
Sprache:
Englisch
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107565258
