UID:
almafu_9959240038402883
Format:
1 online resource (xxii, 368 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
1-107-71323-4
,
1-283-32916-6
,
9786613329165
,
0-511-16543-9
,
0-511-81382-1
,
0-511-16612-5
,
0-511-16417-3
,
0-511-55570-9
,
0-511-16497-1
Series Statement:
Churchill lectures in economics
Content:
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Getting to work -- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms -- The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence -- Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences -- Interdependence of types and values -- Auctions in context -- Uniform price auctions -- Package auctions and combinatorial bidding.
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-53672-3
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-55184-6
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813825
