UID:
almafu_9959691733802883
Format:
1 online resource (xxx, 396 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-316-05657-0
,
1-316-05421-7
,
1-316-08258-X
,
1-316-08022-6
,
1-107-32636-2
,
1-316-07076-X
,
1-316-07548-6
,
1-316-07785-3
,
1-316-07312-2
Series Statement:
Cambridge studies in international and comparative law ; v.110
Content:
Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties provides the first systematic analysis of the consequences of the substantive protections that investment treaties provide to foreign investors. It proposes a new framework for identifying and evaluating the costs and benefits of differing levels of investment treaty protection, and uses this framework to evaluate the levels of protection for foreign investors implied by different interpretations of the fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation provisions of investment treaties. The author examines the arguments and assumptions of both supporters and critics of investment treaties, seeks to test whether they are coherent and borne out by evidence, and concludes that the 'economic' justifications for investment treaty protections are much weaker than is generally assumed. As such, the 'economic' objectives of investment treaties are not necessarily in tension with other 'non-economic' objectives. These findings have important implications for the drafting and interpretation of investment treaties.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 14 Jan 2016).
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Cover; Half title; Series; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgements; List of abbreviations; Table of arbitral awards and cases; Cases; Investor-state arbitral awards; Other arbitral awards; Table of treaties; Table of UN documents; 1 Introduction; 1.1 A brief history of investment treaties; 1.2 The scope of the inquiry; 1.2.1 The evaluation of levels of protection derived from existing arbitral jurisprudence; 1.2.2 The prospective evaluation of legal rules; 1.2.3 Exceptions to substantive protections; 1.2.4 Evaluation from a general, impartial perspective
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1.3 Outline of the argument2 The structure of existing debate; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Assumptions and premises in social scientific scholarship on investment treaties; 2.2.1 'Rational actor' theories explaining why states sign investment treaties; 2.2.2 Theories explaining the content of investment treaties; 2.2.3 Summary of social scientific scholarship; 2.3 Criticisms of investment treaties; 2.3.1 Historical methodology and critique; 2.3.2 Comparative methodology and critique; 2.3.3 Razian rule of law norms as a basis for critique; 2.3.4 Sovereignty as a basis for critique
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2.3.5 Human rights norms as a basis for critique2.3.6 Environmental norms as a basis for critique; 2.4 Justifications for investment treaties and investment treaty protections; 2.4.1 Realisation of treaties' purpose as a basis for justification; 2.4.2 Consent as a basis for justification; 2.4.3 Norms of good governance as a basis for justification; 2.5 The role of secondary norms in debate about investment treaties; 2.6 Synthesis of existing debate as it relates to investment treaty protections; 3 A framework for evaluating different levels of investment treaty protection; 3.1 Introduction
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3.2 Methodology: the relationship between theory and evidence3.2.1 The influence of the New Haven school of law and economics; 3.2.2 To what extent do the decisions of arbitral tribunals constitute evidence?; 3.3 Investment treaty protections as liability rules; 3.4 Efficiency - net economic benefits (or costs); 3.4.1 The concept of efficiency; 3.4.2 The relationship between efficiency and other consequences; 3.4.3 Theory and evidence in the efficiency analysis; 3.4.4 Free markets and competitive equality: a basic efficiency analysis; 3.4.5 Efficient government and investor conduct
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3.4.6 Property rights and efficiency: the Coase theorem3.4.7 Summary of efficiency; 3.5 Distributive consequences - the fair allocation of economic costs and benefits; 3.5.1 Evidence and theory in the analysis of distributive consequences; 3.5.2 The nature and extent of the distributive consequences of investment treaty protections; 3.5.3 Evaluating the distributive consequences of investment treaties; 3.5.4 A theory of 'compensatory' justice cannot explain why compensation should be paid for some losses caused by the state but not others; 3.5.5 Libertarian theories of distributive justice
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3.5.6 Egalitarian theories of distributive justice
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-61595-X
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-04241-0
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107326361
