UID:
almahu_9947414121902882
Format:
1 online resource (xv, 221 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9780511510144 (ebook)
Series Statement:
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Content:
This study offers a theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book contradict some assumptions that only independent judges rule against the government of the day. Set in the context of Argentina, the study uses the tools of positive political theory to explore the conditions under which courts rule against the government. In addition to shedding light on the dynamics of court-executive relations in Argentina, the study provides general lessons about institutions, instability, and the rule of law. In the process, the study builds a set of connections among diverse bodies of scholarship, including US judicial politics, comparative institutional analysis, positive political theory, and Latin American politics.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Ruling against the rulers -- The logic of strategic defection -- A theory of court-executive relations : insecure tenure, incomplete information, and strategic behavior -- Judges, generals, and presidents : institutional insecurity on the Argentine Supreme Court, 1976-1999 -- The reverse legal-political cycle : an analysis of decision making on the Argentine Supreme Court -- The dynamics of defection : human rights, civil liberties, and presidential power -- Conclusion: Broader lessons and future directions.
Additional Edition:
Print version: ISBN 9780521820592
Language:
English
Subjects:
Political Science
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510144
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
