UID:
almahu_9947414131202882
Format:
1 online resource (xviii, 274 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9780511510205 (ebook)
Series Statement:
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Content:
This book was first published in 2004. Under what conditions, in what ways, and with what effects do actors engage in politics with respect to, rather than merely within, political institutions? Using multiple methods and original data, Procedural Politics develops a theory of everyday politics with respect to rules - procedural politics - and applies it to European Union integration and politics. Assuming that actors influence maximizers, it argues and demonstrates that the jurisdiction ambiguity of issues provides opportunities for procedural politics and that influence-differences among institutional alternatives provide the incentives. It also argues and demonstrates that procedural politics occurs by predictable means (most notably, involving procedural coalition formation and strategic issue-definition) and exerts predictable effects on policymaking efficiency and outcomes and long-run institutional change. Beyond illuminating previously under-appreciated aspects of EU rule governance, these findings generalize to all rule-governed political systems and form the basis of fuller accounts of the role of institutions in political life.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Part I: -- 1. Introduction: choice, constraint, and European Union institutions -- 2. Theorizing procedural politics: issues, interests, and institutional choice -- 3. The EU as a procedural system: Rules, preferences, and Strategic interaction -- 4. Patterns: Determinants and Effects of EU procedural politics -- 5. Greening the market? Procedural politics and EU Environmental policy -- 6. Mad cow and Englishmen: procedural politics and EU agricultural policy -- 7. Conclusion: procedural politics and rule governance in the EU and beyond.
Additional Edition:
Print version: ISBN 9780521832533
Language:
English
Subjects:
Political Science
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510205
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
