UID:
almahu_9947414142202882
Format:
1 online resource (xii, 210 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9780511510557 (ebook)
Series Statement:
Political economy of institutions and decisions
Content:
This book develops new theory about the link between debt and democracy and applies it to a classic historical comparison: Great Britain in the eighteenth century which had strong representative institutions and sound public finance vs. ancient regime France, which had neither. The book argues that whether representative institutions improve commitment depends on the opportunities for government creditors to form new coalitions with other social groups, more likely to occur when a society is divided across multiple political cleavages. It then presents historical evidence to show that improved access to finance in Great Britain after 1688 had as much to do with the development of the Whig Party as with constitutional changes. In France, it is suggested that the balance of partisan forces made it unlikely that an early adoption of 'English-style' institutions would have improved credibility.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Introduction --
,
Model of Credible Commitment under Representative Government --
,
Historical Background: Sovereign Borrowing in Europe before 1688 --
,
Trends in French and British Sovereign Borrowing, 1689-1789 --
,
Partisan Politics and Public Debt in Great Britain, 1689-1742 --
,
Partisan Politics and Public Debt in France, 1689-1789 --
,
Stability of Representative Institutions in France and Great Britain --
,
Conclusion.
Additional Edition:
Print version: ISBN 9780521809672
Language:
English
Subjects:
History
,
Economics
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510557
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
