UID:
almafu_9960120055502883
Format:
1 online resource (xii, 280 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
0-511-89576-3
Content:
This volume examines just why and in what sense, Sir Karl Popper's view of empirical falsifiability as the distinguishing characteristic of science has found appeal among economists. The limitations of this tenet, both for a philosophy of science and as a guideline to economic inquiry, are examined, as are several of the proposed alternatives.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Part I. Popper as a philosopher of science: 1. An appraisal of Popperian methodology Daniel M. Hausman; 2. The natural order J. Klant; Part II. Popper among the economists: 3. Ad hocness in economics and the Popperian tradition D. Wade Hands; 4. Popper and the LSE economists Neil de Marchi; Part III. Falsification and trying to do without it: 5. The case for falsification Terence W. Hutchison; 6. John Hicks and the methodology of economics Mark Blaug; Part IV. The missing chapter: empirical work and its appraisal: 7. Finding a satisfactory empirical model Mary Morgan; 8. The neo-Walrasian program is empirically progressive E. Roy Weintraub; Part V. Non-Popperian perspectives on economics: 9. The case for pluralism Bruce J. Caldwell; 10. Thick and thin methodologies in the history of economic thought Donald N. McCloskey; 11. Economics as discourse Arjo Klamer.
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-07023-6
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-35576-1
Language:
English
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511895760
