UID:
almahu_9947415286602882
Umfang:
1 online resource (xiii, 306 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9781139094023 (ebook)
Inhalt:
Why do some governments improve public services more effectively than others? Through the investigation of a new era of administrative reform, in which digital technologies may be used to facilitate citizens' access to the state, Jennifer Bussell's analysis provides unanticipated insights into this fundamental question. In contrast to factors such as economic development or electoral competition, this study highlights the importance of access to rents, which can dramatically shape the opportunities and threats of reform to political elites. Drawing on a sub-national analysis of twenty Indian states, a field experiment, statistical modeling, case studies, interviews of citizens, bureaucrats and politicians, and comparative data from South Africa and Brazil, Bussell shows that the extent to which politicians rely on income from petty and grand corruption is closely linked to variation in the timing, management and comprehensiveness of reforms.
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
1. Introduction -- 2. Explaining the politics of technology-enabled public services -- 3. Do reforms affect the quality of services? -- 4. Policy initiation in the Indian states -- 5. The scope of reform I: patterns of policy implementation -- 6. The scope of reform II: coalition governments -- 7. From "petty" to "grand" corruption: ownership, management, and the scale of reform -- 8. Technology-enabled administrative reforms in cross-national perspective -- 9. Conclusion.
Weitere Ausg.:
Print version: ISBN 9781107019058
Sprache:
Englisch
Schlagwort(e):
Electronic books
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139094023
URL:
Volltext
(URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
