UID:
almahu_9947415401702882
Format:
1 online resource (xi, 195 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9780511896033 (ebook)
Content:
In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Additional Edition:
Print version: ISBN 9780521245890
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
