UID:
almafu_9959241627102883
Format:
1 online resource (276 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
94-6274-434-3
Note:
Includes index.
,
Cover; Title Page; Table of Contents; Glossary; 1 Introduction; 1 Introduction of the topic; 2 Central subject of this book and limiation of scope; 3 Overview of contents; 4 Methodology; 2 Efficient bankruptcy law in the U.S. and the Netherlands. Establishing an assessment framework; 1 Bankruptcy procedure in the US; 2 Bankruptcy procedure in the Netherlands; 1 Why does bankruptcy law exist?; 1.1 The common pool problem; 1.2 The balance-sheet insolvent debtor; 1.3 The cash-flow insolvent debtor; 1.4 Commons and anticommons; 2 The (hypothetical) creditors' bargain
,
3 The creditors' bargain theory and absolute priority4 The creditors' bargain theory and the new value exception; 1 Risk sharing as a goal of bankruptcy; 1.1 Diversification of common risks; 1.2 Minimizing perverse incentives on the eve of bankruptcy; 1.3 Protection of idiosyncratic value; 1.4 Protecting non-consensual claims; 2 Why risk sharing is not a goal of bankruptcy; 2.1 Limited class of beneficiaries; 2.2 Higher costs because of behavior by secured creditor; 2.3 Higher costs because of behavior by manager-shareholder
,
2.4 Contractual risk sharing as an alternative for mandated risk sharing3 Rehabilitation and the interests of non-property right holders as a goal of bankruptcy; 3.1 The justification for including non-economic values in the goals ofbankruptcy law: the rehabilitation view; 3.2 The justification for including non-economic values in the goals ofbankruptcy law: feminism and communitarianism; 3.3 The justification for including non-economic values in the goal ofbankruptcy law: the bankruptcy choice situation; 3.3.1 Bankruptcy as a response to financial distress; 3.3.2 The bankruptcy choice model
,
4 The case against introducing substantive policies in bankruptcy4.1 The social costs of internalization; 4.1.1 Re-distributional objectives increase the cost of credit; 4.1.2 The forum shopping problem; 4.1.3 Equity reasons; 4.2 Redistribution of wealth by other means than internalization; 4.3 The lack of a clear and consistent value view-framework; 5 Team production theory as an explanation for bankruptcy law; 5.1 The team production problem; 5.2 Team production theory; 5.3 Team production theory: maximizing stakeholder value and themediating hierarch
,
5.4 The team production theory in bankruptcy6 Why the team production theory is inadequate; 6.1 The primacy of shareholder value maximization; 6.2 Team production theory does not work in bankruptcy; 3 Shaping bankruptcy. What form shouldit take?; 1 Bankruptcy procedure in the U.S.; 2 Bankruptcy procedure in the Netherlands; 1 The administrative reorganization procedure; 1.1 The administrative reorganization procedures; 1.2 Costs of an administrative reorganization procedure; 1.2.1 Valuation uncertainty; 1.2.2 Direct costs; 1.2.3 Speed; 1.2.4 Perverse incentives for management
,
2 Ex ante capital structures
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 94-6236-629-2
Language:
English
Keywords:
Electronic books.
