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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    UID:
    almafu_9958069282402883
    Format: 1 online resource (49 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: May 1999 - Institutional arrangements have helped Colombia manage the fiscal aspects of decentralization, despite the country's political problems. Colombia's political geography contrasts sharply with its economy. Physical characteristics and guerilla war fragment the country geographically, yet it has a long tradition of political centrism and macroeconomic stability. Recently, with political and economic decentralization, there has been some weakening of macroeconomic performance. Dillinger and Webb explore institutional arrangements that have helped Colombia manage the fiscal aspects of decentralization, despite the country's political problems. Fiscal decentralization proceeded rapidly in Colombia. Education, health, and much infrastructure provision have been decentralized to the departmentos and municipios. Decentralization has led to substantial but not overwhelming problems, both in maintaining fiscal balance nationally (as resources are transferred to subnational levels) and in preventing unsustainable deficits by the subnational governments. The problems have arisen because central government interference prevents departments from controlling their costs and because of expectations of debt bailouts. Both are legacies of the earlier pattern of management from the center, and some recent changes-especially about subnational debt-may improve matters. Colombia's traditional political process has had difficulty dealing with problems of decentralization because traditional parties are weak in internal organization and have lost de facto rule over substantial territories. The fiscal problems of subnational government have been contained, however, because subnational governments are relatively weak politically and the central government, for the time being, has been able to enforce restrictions on subnational borrowing. This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Latin America and Caribbean Region-is part of a larger effort in the region to examine the macroeconomic consequences of decentralization. The authors may be contacted at wdillinger@worldbank.org or swebb@worldbank.org.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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