Online Resource
Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
UID:
almafu_9958109647002883
Format:
1 online resource (38 pages)
Series Statement:
Policy research working papers.
Content:
An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping, and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This paper looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The paper identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition: the inability, under a rule of law, to forgive theft. This can lead to the perpetuation of the non-rule-of-law state, even when it might seem that the alternative is Pareto-improving.
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1596/1813-9450-4520
URL:
Volltext
(Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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