Format:
1 Online-Ressource (224 Seiten)
Edition:
1st ed
ISBN:
9783748909637
Series Statement:
Fundamenta Juridica. Beiträge zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung v.73
Note:
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
,
Cover -- Introduction -- Thinking about legitimacy -- The liberal perspective on legitimacy -- The challenge of pluralism and public justification -- Legitimacy as public justification in Rawls's work -- The structure of the book -- Part I - Liberal legitimacy in context -- 1. The concept of legitimacy -- 1.1 The elements of political power -- 1.1.1 The political system -- 1.1.2 The means of the political system -- 1.2 Concepts and conceptions of legitimacy -- 1.3 Empirical conceptions of legitimacy -- 1.3.1 Weber's belief-based conception of legitimacy -- 1.3.2 Beetham's hybrid conception of legitimacy -- 1.4 Normative (especially liberal) conceptions of legitimacy -- 1.4.1 Legitimacy and the resolution of political disagreements -- 1.4.2 Legitimacy, the justification of coercion, and obligation -- 1.4.3 The standards of legitimacy -- 1.5 Conclusion of the chapter -- 2. Liberal legitimacy and public justification -- 2.1 Two ideas of consent -- 2.2 Voluntarist accounts and their shortcomings -- 2.3 Hypothetical agreement and contractualism -- 2.3.1 The point of contractualist theories -- 2.3.2 The normative role of reasons in contractualist theories -- 2.3.3 The example of Kant's contractualism -- 2.4 Legitimacy as public justification -- 2.4.1 From philosophical to public justification -- 2.4.2 The challenge of legitimacy as public justification -- 2.5 Conclusion of the chapter -- Part II: Liberal legitimacy in a Rawlsian framework -- 3. Justice and legitimacy before the political turn -- 3.1 The nature of justification and reflective equilibrium -- 3.2 The contractualist argument for justice as fairness -- 3.2.1 The contractualist device of the original position -- 3.2.2 Two core ideas -- 3.2.2.1 Society as a system of fair cooperation -- 3.2.2.2 The two moral powers as the basis of freedom and equality
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3.2.3 The original position as a device of representation -- 3.2.4 The argument from the original position -- 3.3 Democratic politics and legitimacy in Theory -- 3.3.1 The application of the principles of justice -- 3.3.2 Justice, legitimacy, and obligation -- 3.4 The stability of a well-ordered society as a justificatory condition -- 3.4.1 Stability for the right reasons -- 3.4.2 The normative role of stability in Theory -- 3.4.3 The idea of a well-ordered society -- 3.4.4 The argument for convergence on justice as fairness -- 3.5 Conclusion of the chapter -- 4. The challenge of reasonable disagreement -- 4.1 Reasonable disagreement and the burdens of judgment -- 4.2 Reasonable disagreement and the fundamentals of Theory -- 4.3 The problems with reasonable disagreement and pluralism -- 4.4 Conclusion of the chapter -- 5. Liberal legitimacy in Political Liberalism -- 5.1 The political conception of justice -- 5.1.1 The three features of a political conception -- 5.1.2 The content of public political culture and the process of justification -- 5.1.3 Reasonable conceptions of justice and generic liberalism -- 5.1.4 Excursus: the philosophical status of PL's argument -- 5.1.4.1 The role of PL's argument for a liberal conception of justice -- 5.1.4.2 The normative foundation of PL's argument for a liberal conception of justice -- 5.2 (Un)Reasonable citizens and the limits of public justification -- 5.2.1 The epistemic components of reasonableness -- 5.2.2 The ethical components of reasonableness -- 5.2.2.1 The idea of reasonable citizens -- 5.2.2.2 Impermissible conceptions of the good and comprehensive doctrines -- 5.2.3 Unreasonable citizens and public justification -- 5.2.4 The rights of unreasonable citizens -- 5.2.5 Vagueness and the limits of reasonable disagreement -- 5.3 The role of overlapping consensus -- 5.3.1 The idea of overlapping consensus
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5.3.2 The road to an overlapping consensus -- 5.3.3 Reasonable comprehensive doctrines and overlapping consensus -- 5.3.4 Legitimacy and overlapping consensus -- 5.4 Public reason and the legitimate exercise of political power -- 5.4.1 The constitutional framework and legitimacy -- 5.4.2 Public reason as a precondition for the legitimate exercise of political power -- 5.4.2.1 The idea of public reason -- 5.4.2.2 Range of application -- 5.4.3 Neuralgic points of public reason and political liberalism -- 5.4.3.1 Public reason as a normative notion (not primarily epistemic) -- 5.4.3.2 Public reason and dependence on comprehensive doctrines -- 5.4.3.3 The historical contingency of public reason -- 5.4.3.4 The indeterminacy of public reason -- 5.4.3.5 Public reason, neutrality, and public justification -- 5.4.3.6 Political liberalism and unrealistic views of the political -- 5.5 Conclusion of the chapter -- 6. Beyond legitimacy as public justification -- 6.1 The duties of citizens who reject political liberalism -- 6.2 The normative authority of partially illegitimate legislation -- 6.3 The political and philosophical status of political liberalism -- 6.4 Conclusion of the chapter -- Conclusion -- Bibliography
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Wenner, Fabian Liberal Legitimacy : The justification of political power in the work of John Rawls Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,c2020 ISBN 9783848768677
Language:
English
Subjects:
Political Science
,
Law
,
Philosophy
Keywords:
Rawls, John 1921-2002
;
Legitimität
;
Hochschulschrift
