UID:
edocfu_9958352070402883
Format:
1 online resource
ISBN:
9780231535410
Series Statement:
Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
Content:
The British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when they tried to suppress insurgent violence, and their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past wars failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these campaigns against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, the volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of the British military's institutional response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring prevalence of insurgent methods, Counterinsurgency in Crisis underscores the need for military organizations and governments alike to anticipate and prepare for the irregular wars of tomorrow.
Note:
Frontmatter --
,
Contents --
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Foreword --
,
Preface --
,
Acknowledgments --
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Abbreviations --
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Introduction: Rethinking counterinsurgency --
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1. Untangling the british counterinsurgency legacy --
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2. The british in basra. With heads held high into the abyss --
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3. Act II: British counterinsurgency in Helmand --
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4. “A horse and tank moment” --
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5. Whither british counterinsurgency? Learning from experience: What went wrong? --
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Notes --
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Bibliography --
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Index
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.7312/ucko16426
