UID:
edocfu_9958353374802883
Format:
1 online resource (xiii,210pages) :
,
illustrations.
Edition:
Electronic reproduction. Berlin/Boston : De Gruyter, 2015. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Edition:
System requirements: Web browser.
Edition:
Access may be restricted to users at subscribing institutions.
ISBN:
9781501501982
Series Statement:
Epistemische Studien; 31
Content:
Verificationism has been a hallmark of logical empiricism. In the last 50 years, this view has, however, received tremendously bad press as its advocates failed to resolve its problems. Modern theories of justification and belief revision, along with a formal semantics for counterfactuals, can help overcome these problems. Therefore, it is worth revisiting this disreputable view. The author argues in favor of a weak form of verificationism.
Note:
Frontmatter --
,
Acknowledgements --
,
Contents --
,
Figures and Tables --
,
Introduction: Does This Make Nonsense to You? --
,
1 Some Historic Formulations and Their Problems --
,
2 More Problems Lie Ahead --
,
3 Toward a Solution to the Problems --
,
4 Minimal Verificationism --
,
5 Fallibilist Theories of Justification --
,
6 The Standard Theory of Belief Revision: AGM --
,
7 Combining Theories of Justification and Belief Revision: JuDAS --
,
8 Lewis’ Semantics for Counterfactuals --
,
9 Towards a Verifiability-Friendly Semantics for Counterfactuals --
,
10 (Non) Concluding Remarks --
,
References --
,
Name Index --
,
Subject Index.
,
Also available in print edition.
,
In English.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9781501510571
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9781501501999
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1515/9781501501982
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501501982
